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In a series of empirical studies, my colleagues and I have explored judges'
and juries' behavior and the "appearance ofjustice" in actual trials.' We have
examined various legal and extralegal influences on trial decision-making
2processes. In particular, empirical studies we conducted in the California
courts focused on the role of judges' behavior and the "appearance of justice"
in predicting the outcome of criminal jury trials.'
This Article extends the prior research in several important ways. First, the
relationships among legal factors (e.g., evidence) and extralegal factors (e.g.,
preconceived biases and behavior related to the appearance of justice) is
explored through further empirical testing of a theoretical model of courtroom
dynamics. These relationships are examined in a study conducted in the Iowa
courts, the first such study of extralegal influence in bench trials.
Second, this Article begins to model the combined and independent impact
of evidentiary and extralegal factors on decision making and sentencing iin
criminal bench trials. The analyses test the conclusion by others that, in some
cases, extralegal factors such as judges' nonverbal communications to trial
participants have a relatively greater impact on trial outcomes than does the
1. See generally Peter D. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges'and Juries'
Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775 (1991) [hereinafter Empirical Research]; Peter D. Blanck et al., The
Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Frameworkfor Exploring Trial Judges'Behavior, 75 IOWA
L. REv. 653, 655-57 (1990) [hereinafter The Measure of the Judge] (describing research that studied
judges' behavior to determine if it "appears" to trial participants to be fair and impartial); Peter D.
Blanck et al., Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal
Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 89-97 (1985) [hereinafter The Appearance of Justice] (discussing
judicial influence and its relationship to procedural due process).
As I noted in an earlier study, due process in a criminal trial mandates that the trial judge not display
bias toward the defendant. Empirical Research, supra, at 776.
Trial judges are not only required to be fair and impartial, they must also "satisfy the
appearance of justice." The judge's appearance or extralegal behavior must not indicate to thejury or to other trial participants that the judge believes the defendant is guilty. The appearance
of judicial bias alone is grounds for reversal even if the trial judge is completely impartial.
Id. at 776 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 776 nn.l-3 and cases cited therein; see also Etzel v.
Rosenbloom, 189 P.2d 848, 852 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) ("Four things belong to a judge: to hear
courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially." (quoting Socrates)).
2. Other researchers have argued that the information available to jurors in criminal trials falls into
two primary categories: evidentiary (e.g., pertaining to the crime) and nonevidentiary (e.g., pertaining
to defendants' background characteristics). See Martin F. Kaplan & Gwen DeArment Kemmerick, Juror
Judgment as Information Integration: Combining Evidential and Nonevidential Information, 30 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 493 (1974).
3. See The Appearance ofJustice, supra note I (reporting results of study of 34 misdemeanor jury
trials conducted in California Municipal Court); Communicating with Juries, Panel One: Judge-Jury
Communications: Improving Communications and Understanding Bias, The Annenberg Washington
Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68 IND. L.J. 1037 (1993) [hereinafter Panel One] (introductory
remarks of moderator Steven Adler) (suggesting that there is not necessarily one key moment during
trial that influences juries' decision-making processes; rather, there are complex relationships among
courtroom players).
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strength of the evidence.4 The analyses also explore the relation between
judges' fact-finding behavior and their subsequent sentencing patterns in
bench trials.
Third, this Article extends the model and empirical framework to provide
a more comprehensive view of the nature of the adversarial process.5 For
instance, it examines the impact of the perceived competence and influence
of the trial participants-judge and counsel-on trial outcomes and sentenc-
ing. Moreover, this Article looks at courtroom behavior in lower state courts,
where it is estimated that ninety to ninety-five percent of all cases are
handled.6 Further study of the adversarial process in this context is needed
because "[n]ext to the police, the lower criminal courts play the most
important role in forming citizen impressions of the American system of
criminal justice."' In these ways, this Article sets forth a method for
researchers, practitioneis, and courts to assess factors that may impact,
sometimes impermissibly, on decision making in actual trials.
Part I of this Article describes the theoretical model and research frame-
work, including the various legal and extralegal measures for exploring the
impact of judges' behavior on trial outcomes and sentencing in bench trials.'
Part II summarizes findings from a prior test of the model in California jury
trials (the "Stanford Study"). Parts III and IV then present the method and
results for the test of the model in Iowa bench trials (the "Iowa Study").
Finally, Part V discusses emerging issues in the analysis of courtroom
behavior, including the study of trial error, disqualification law, and
sentencing patterns.
Judges, like all human beings, develop certain beliefs about the defendant's
guilt or innocence.9 Courts, legal scholars, practitioners, and social scientists
4. For a review, see J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A
Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741 (1988) (responding to prior
criticism that availability of prior psychological research on trial processes enhances lawyers' abilities
to influence jurors).
5. See id. at 759-71 (arguing that critics of psychology and law research misunderstand the
complexity of trial processes). For a review of the importance of replication of social science research,
see Robert Rosenthal, How Are We Doing in Soft Psychology?, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 775 (1990)
(demonstrating the importance of replication and cumulation of social science research).
6. John Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of
Sentencing Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM II (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON SENTENCING].
7. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT xv (1979).
8. See infra part I (discussing model to describe and document judge behavior).
9. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that the judge may reveal these
beliefs during trial by directing the trial based on the judge's own expectations); see also Panel One,
supra note 3, at 1040 (statement of Steven Adler) (observing that the entire trial sends a message to
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recognize that extralegal influences may have important effects on trial
processes and outcomes.' ° Some trial and appellate courts acknowledge that
juries, witnesses, or other trial participants accord great weight and deference
to even the most subtle behaviors of the judge." Little information, however,
is available about the extent to which trial judges themselves are sensitive to,
or even conscious of, the effect that their extralegal behavior might have on
fact finding, trial outcomes, or their sentencing patterns. 2 The few studies
conducted indicate strong judicial interest in exploring the connection between
courtroom behavior and trial outcomes. 13
Existing judicial training programs across the country explore the impor-
tance of judges' behavior and decision making in the courtroom. 4 Most trial
jurors about who is right and wrong); id. at 1041 (statement of Robert Rosenthal) (noting that judges'
expectations may sometimes act as .a self-fulfilling prophecy); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND
OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIvISM 129 (1983) (arguing that human beings can never be devoid of
prejudices) (citing HANS-GEoRG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEurics 9 (David E. Linge trans.,
1976)).
10. See Panel One, supra note 3, at 1040 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell) (noting that Stanford
Study was undertaken by a coalition of academicians, social scientists, practitioners, and judges); see
also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (providing classic study of
judges and juries); JOHN P. RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND
PERFORMANCE (1980) (encompassing comprehensive analysis ofjudges' behavior); The Measure of the
Judge, supra note 1, at 654 & n.12 (discussing books, articles, and studies recognizing importance of
judge's behavior).
11. As Judge Jochems remarked in 1930, "[t]he trial judge occupies a high position. He presides
over the trial. The jury has great respect for him. They can be easily influenced by the slightest
suggestion coming from the court, whether it be a nod of the head, a smile, a frown, or a spoken word."
State v. Wheat, 292 P. 793, 797 (Kan. 1930) (Jochems, J., dissenting), quoted in State v. Hamilton, 731
P.2d 863, 868 (Kan. 1987); Marino v. Cocuzza, 81 A.2d 181, 185 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1951); see
also The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 155-56 (giving pattern jury instruction warning that
behavior of judge during trial should not influence jury decision making).
12. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1992) (questioning whether
judges or jurors "know bias when they see it"); see also LaDoris H. Cordell & Florence 0. Keller, Pay
No Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68 IND. L.J. 1199
(1993) (arguing that jurors attribute certain opinions, feelings, and biases to judicial personnel through
transference).
13. See Panel One, supra note 3, at 1043 (statement of Robert Rosenthal) (expressing concern about
judges' behavior and its effect on juries); see also George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90, 99 (1919) (providing an early study of magistrates, which concluded
that "[t]hese studies of the work of magistrates' records ... are startling because they show us so clearly
to how great an extent justice resolves itself into the personality of the judge"); cf. CATHERINE
FITZMAURICE & KEN PEASE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING 7 (1986) (providing a
comparative study of sentencing and noting alleged remark by Lord Chief Justice that research on
judicial behavior "would not tell judges anything they did not already know.. .'); Robert Hanley, A
Courtroom Experiment in High-Tech Video, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at B8 (discussing judge's
informal study of videotapes of courtroom proceedings to analyze his own performance and behaviors).
14. The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 676 (discussing program that videotapes and
analyzes judge's behavior during trial proceedings).
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judges, however, receive little feedback about their courtroom communication,
and what little they do receive is mostly anecdotal. 5 This may be in part
because there are few standardized methods through which such feedback may
be provided, 6 judges are reluctant to receive such feedback, 7 or judges
lack effective techniques for monitoring the impact of their courtroom
behavior."8
Appellate courts assess the propriety and impact of legal and extralegal
factors on jury and judge decision making by balancing a number of
factors. 9 These factors include the relevance and nature of the behavior, the
efficiency of any instruction used to cure the error, and the prejudicial effect
of the behavior in light of the entire trial.2° However, the validity of these
factors has not been tested through empirical study of actual trials, and the
lack of systematic information is glaring.2' Moreover, ad hoc, case-by-case
determinations of the appearance of justice and trial error result because
reviewing courts typically evaluate the record as a whole in determining trial
fairness, judicial bias, or prejudicial error.22 The present research continues
the development of more systematic approaches for assessing trial fairness,
as well as the legal parameters of trial error.23 This program of study is
warranted, considering the view by some that the viable role of federal and
15. Panel One, supra note 3, at 1046 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell); Cordell & Keller, supra
note 12, at 1202-03.
16. Panel One, supra note 3, at 1045.46 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell) (suggesting that
jurors, at the end of a trial, are excellent sources of feedback for trial judges about individual judge's
performance).
17. In this regard, it may be interesting to compare the behavior of elected versus appointed state
court judges.
18. Panel One, supra note 3, at 1053 (statement of Robert Rosenthal) (commenting that
communication trainers have not yet proven to be effective).
19. See United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that "[the
reviewing court should be more concerned with a comment on a matter central to the defense than with
comment on a tangential issue"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d
371, 374-75 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that judge's comment on defendant's credibility was one factor in
appellate court's reversal of conviction). See generally infra part V (discussing error and judges'
behavior).
20. Oglin, 745 F.2d at 268-69; The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 95-96 (reviewing
appellate courts' factor approach in assessing propriety of judge's behavior). See generally infra part
V.
21. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to
Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 163 (1991) (noting the lack of systematic study of
harmless error rule). See generally Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too), 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 387-88 (1992) (suggesting some positive effects of psychological inquiry
in the legal system).
22. Emily Wheeler, The Constitutional Right to a Trial Before a Neutral Judge: Federalism Tips
the Balance Against State Habeas Petitioners, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 850-51, 875, 876 n.181 (1985)
(citing cases that demonstrate this trend).
23. See infra part V (discussing emerging issues in the study of trials).
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warranted, considering the view by some that the viable role of federal and
state appellate courts in overseeing the appearance of justice and the conduct
of trial judges is even more important than the right to an impartial judge.24
Legal practitioners are similarly interested in the impact ofjudges' behavior
on courtroom fairness. The American Bar Association's 1990 amendments to
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct include a canon that emphasizes the need
for the appearance of fairness and justice in the courtroom.25 Yet, like
judges, legal practitioners rarely rely on systematic methods for assessing
judges' or other trial participants' behavior and its impact on trial fairness.26
To the contrary, practitioners often confuse conceptions of trial fairness and
judicial impartiality.27 Professor Leubsdorf writes: "Educated by the Legal
Realists and their successors, lawyers fear that the values and experiences of
judges ultimately shape their decisions. Yet lawyers also believe that it must
mean something to speak of a judge as impartial, and we also suspect that the
24. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 17-18, § 3-39, at
147 (1978) (discussing the constitutional role of state courts and the appellate system); Wheeler, supra
note 22, at 850-51 (describing the appellate courts' responsibility to maintain standards of justice in
lower criminal courts, and concluding that the lack of a well-defined constitutional right to an impartial
judge means that claims of judicial bias merge with unfair trial claims, which often do not violate the
due process standard of fundamental fairness).
25. The Code states:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice... based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status,
and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control
to do so.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5) (ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility 1990).
The commentary to the canon states:
A judge must perform judicial duties impartially and fairly. A judge who manifests bias on any
basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into
disrepute. Facial expressions and body language, in addition to oral communication, can give
to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and others an appearance of judicial
bias. A judge must be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial.
Id.
26. See Charles-Edward Anderson, Trial by Press?: Pretrial Publicity Doesn 't Bias Jurors, Panelists
Say, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 32 (reporting consensus of panelists at The Annenberg Washington
Program that jurors subject to extensive publicity can put aside preconceptions ifjudges provide proper
instructions and other curative assistance); John B. McConahay et al., The Uses of Social Science in
Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,
213-20 (1977) (recounting juror selection strategies based on empirical model, personality traits, and
juxr nonverbal behavior); Panel One, supra note 3, at 1044 (statement of Charles Rulff) (commenting
that lawyers can do little to effect communication problems and bias in the courtroom).
27. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237,
245 (1987) (suggesting that in this confusion is a repressed crisis of confidence in the idea of judicial
impartiality).
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role of law depends on the belief that the rule of law is more than a masquer-
ade."2
Some empirical studies by social scientists help reveal the complexity of the
study of judges' behavior in jury and bench trials 29 and replace unsubstanti-
ated myths about courtroom behavior with empirically validated conclu-
sions.30 Prior studies suggest that although trial outcomes are not always the
product of rational legal analysis, popular criticisms ofjury or judge decision-
making abilities often are based on perceived problems with the comprehensi-
bility of the law or other procedural factors portrayed as inherent to our
system of justice.
This Article describes ongoing work on an empirically based framework and
model that tests the observation that extralegal factors, sometimes only the
subtle and unintentional nonverbal behavior of judges, might alone predict
trial outcomes and sentencing patterns.32 The efforts in the Stanford Study
and the Iowa Study are highlighted next as a step toward developing this body
of research. 3
28. Id. at 245 (emphasis in original). Leubsdorf also concludes that the appearance of justice
standard "can best be understood as an unsatisfactory attempt to mediate between introspection and
objectivity." Id. at 277.
29. See Panel One, supra note 3, at 1042-43 (statement of Robert Rosenthal) (describing social
science research on self-flulfilling prophecies).
30. See Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal
Psychology, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 40-42 (1979) (criticizing reliance on simulated legal research
for developing practical recommendations); see also Peter D. Blanck & Arthur N. Turner, Gestalt
Research: Clinical-Field-Research Approaches to Studying Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 109, 111 (Jay W. Lorsch ed., 1987) (stating clinical field research is more
appropriate where goal is to improve practice).
31. See Panel One, supra note 3, at 1037-39 (statement of Steven Adler) (suggesting that legal
procedures, as well as the complexity of the law, contribute to juror misunderstanding); see also Michael
J. Saks, Do We Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (reviewing empirical evidence on behavior of tort litigation system and
demonstrating the inadequacy of evidence for drawing conclusions about the way the system actually
performs); Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 742 (arguing that prior critics of legal system exaggerate
the relative importance of legal and extralegal factors on trial outcomes).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 159-63 (discussing research results on effects of judges'
nonverbal behavior on trial outcomes). As my colleagues and I have suggested elsewhere, the intention
in "modeling" courtroom behavior is not to suggest that there is a bright line standard for detecting,
quantifying, or measuring the legally permissible limits of judges' behavior. Measure of the Judge,
supra note I, at 675. Nor is it the intention to suggest that trial judges display great stone faces, showing
no emotion or reaction to the events in the courtroom. The goal of this Article is to highlight the
ongoing tests and refinements of the model of study to aid in the description of courtroom behavior.
33. For a discussion of the generalizability of the results of social science research and the
importance of replication, see The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 136-37 (discussing Stanford
Study implications). See also Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 753 (discussing the importance of
replicating social science research in mock and real settings).
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I. A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF JUDGES' AND JURIES' BEHAVIOR
In a criminal trial, a trial judge's beliefs or expectations for a defendant's
guilt may be manifested either verbally or nonverbally (by facial gestures,
body movements, or tone of voice) and can be reflected in a judge's
comments on evidence, responses to witness testimony, reactions to counsels'
actions, or in rulings on objections. Improper beliefs or expectations, if
manifested in a judge's behavior, could warrant reversal and judicial
disqualification.3 Prior theories of reversible error and judicial disqualifica-
tion have not been framed adequately because models of "how judges should
behave when they do sit" are lacking."
The Stanford Study explored the effects ofjudges' behavior on jury verdicts
and on other trial process variables.37 The preliminary research model
identified several types of variables that need to be studied to achieve a
systematic understanding of judges' behavior and its potential influence on
trial decision making and sentencing patterns.38 The model is illustrated in
Figure 1 and elements of the extended version of the model are summarized
as follows.
39
34. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 90-9 1. Some of the principal ways in which
judges can impermissibly influence the criminal trial process include: (1) disparaging remarks toward
the defendant; (2) bias in rulings or comments; (3) consideration of matters not in evidence; (4) forming
expectations for trial outcome before the defense has presented its case; (5) inappropriate statements of
opinion to the jury during the trial; and (6) failing to control the misconduct of counsel. Id.
35. In the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, the prosecution alleged that the trial judge's bias for
the defendant was reflected through her nonverbal behavior. The prosecution attempted to disqualify the
judge on the grounds, among others, that her facial expressions and body language expressed
preconceived biases about her views of the ultimate trial outcome. One view of the prosecution's attempt
to disqualify the judge is illustrated in Appendix A. See also Leslee Daugherty, State v. Fie:
Determining the Proper Standardfor Recusal ofJudges in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1138, 1139-
40 (1987) (arguing that recusal is appropriate if certain factors are met or if nonrecusal would give the
"appearance" of impropriety).
36. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 239 (arguing also the converse: that models of judicial
behavior cannot be developed without facing their implications for disqualification). In addition, judges
may be perceived by others as not understanding the force and impact of their behavior at trial. See
supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
37. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 101-37 (proposing preliminary model and
describing its characteristics); see also Robert Rosenthal, Pavlov's Mice, Pfingst's Horse and
Pygmalion's PONS: Some Models for the Study of Interpersonal Expectancy Effects, in THE CLEVER
HANS PHENOMENON 185-89 (Thomas A. Sebeok & Robert Rosenthal eds., 1981) (discussing general
model for study of interpersonal expectancy effects).
38. Early studies of courtroom behavior primarily explored bivariate relationships, such as the
relation of race and sentencing. The model here employs bivariate and multivariate techniques, allowing
a more comprehensive view of causal relationships in the courtroom. See Hagan & Bumiller, supra note
6, at 2-4.
39. The model is extended to include the strength of the evidence variable ("C"'), sentencing
patterns ("F"), and the competence/influence variable ("G"). These factors were not tested in the
1126 [Vol. 68:1119










"A ": background variables
Background variables refer to attributes of the trial partici-
pants, such as age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, intellectual
ability, and other personal history factors.4 °
"B ": attitudinal or "expectancy" variables
A judge's beliefs or expectations about trial outcome (whether
actual or perceived by others to be true) can influence the decision-
making process of the judge or jurors. When judges expect a
certain trial outcome, they intentionally or unintentionally behave
in a way that indicates what they think the outcome should be.4'
Stanford Study. For earlier descriptions of the model, see The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at
102 (describing findings for "A-B-C-D" simple relationships only); The Measure of the Judge, supra
note I, at 680-84 (highlighting "A-B-C-D-E-F" model without presentation of preliminary empirical
findings).
40. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 105 & nn. 55-57 (reviewing studies
demonstrating effects of defendant's race on sentencing in death penalty cases and effects of defendant's
criminal history on jury verdicts). In the Stanford Study, we were particularly interested in the extent
to which information about defendants' criminal histories might predict, or be predicted by, the other
variables in the model. This is because frequently the defendants' prior criminal history is known to the
judge but not to the jury, unless the defendant takes the stand to testify, thus making, for example, an
"A-C" relationship even more striking. Cf James W. McElhaney, The Rub, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 80-
83 (noting that most important decision for criminal defendant is whether to take the stand and testify
on his or her own behalf, and most important factor in making that decision is whether judge is going
to let prosecutor cross-examine defendant with regard to prior convictions).
The seriousness of the offense, as measured by the maximum possible sentence, or type of legal
representation, as measured by defendant's choice between legal counsel or pro se defense, are other
examples of possible background variables. See infra notes 109-12.and accompanying text; Steven
Garber et al., The Role of Extralegal Factors in Determining Criminal Case Disposition, in RESEARCH
ON SENTENCING, supra note 6, at 129, 132-35, 138 (listing other potential background variables, and
noting, for example, that seriousness of the .offense is the most important determinant clients use in
choosing an attorney).
41. In doing so, judges set into motion behavior and trial processes that may increase the likelihood
of the occurrence of a certain trial outcome. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note I, at 132-36;
see also State v. Armour, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6098, at *44-*64 (8th Dist. Dec. 19, 1991) (Corrigan,
J., concurring & Harper, J., dissenting) (discussing the appearance ofjustice, judges' expectancy effects,
and trial fairness).
Of course, judges and jurors are not always influenced in their decision making by their initial
expectations, but neither do they always make decisions based on the evidence alone. See Tanford &
Tanford, supra note 4, at 750-51 (noting psychological research showing that jurors have difficulty
putting aside their biases to reach accurate verdicts); cf id. at 748 (noting that those critical of
psychology and law research tend to assume that jurors are either unbiased or can easily set aside their
biases so that they can decide cases solely on the basis of the evidence). See generally INTERPERSONAL
ExPECTATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND APPLICATION (Peter D. Blanck ed., 1993) [hereinafter
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS] (providing an overview of expectancy effects in applied contexts).
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"C": mediating verbal and nonverbal behaviors
Verbal and nonverbal behaviors communicate judges' beliefs
and expectations to the trial participants.42 In the present empirical
framework, verbal and nonverbal behaviors are coded on various
dimensions using ratings of judges' "global" styles (e.g., judicial or
directive style) and "micro" behaviors (e.g., nonverbal behaviors
such as eye contact or head nods) toward different trial partici-
pants.
43
"C"': mediating strength and complexity of the evidence
This variable explores whether, in close cases where the
evidence may be only marginally important, judges' communicative
behavior during bench trials becomes an increasingly important
predictor of trial outcomes." Inclusion of this variable also helps
42. A judge's facial expressions, tone of voice, or other nonverbal behavior can, by itself, influence
jury verdicts, sometimes in impermissible ways. For example, in the often cited case, State v. Barron,
465 S.W.2d 523, 527-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), a Missouri appellate court reversed a burglary conviction
on the grounds of nonverbal prejudicial error by the judge. When listening to the defendant's brother
testify that the defendant was at home watching television when the alleged burglary occurred, the trial
judge placed his hands to the sides of his head, shook his head negatively, and leaned back, swiveling
his chair 180 degrees. Id.
More recently, in analogous situations, social scientists demonstrated that teacher, doctor, and
psychotherapist nonverbal behaviors significantly influence the course of social interaction. See The
Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 108-09 & n.67 (providing investigations that study factors
affecting expectancy effects and processes of interpersonal communication that transmit effects). See
generally Peter D. Blanck & Robert Rosenthal, Nonverbal Behavior in the Courtroom, in APPLICATION
OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIORAL THEORIES AND RESEARCH 89 (Robert Feldman ed., 1992) (summarizing
analogous studies and their relevance to model).
43. In the Iowa Study, two observers independently rated and coded the behavior of judges
throughout entire trials. The observers also coded the behavior of the other trial participants, as well as
other variables in the model. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. Micro nonverbal behaviors
are seven discretely coded actions regularly employed in the study of nonverbal behavior, including: (1)
amount of eye contact with the jury; (2) number of smiles; (3) number of head nods; (4) number of
significant hand movements; (5) number of forward leans to and away from the jury; (6) number of
significant changes in body position (fewer shifts designated as "postural attention"); and (7) number
of self-touching behaviors, such as chin-rubbing. INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS, supra note 41, at 342-
53. For detailed descriptions of the research method, see id. at 342-53 (discussing development of
working model, data-gathering techniques, and calculation of results); The Appearance ofJustice, supra
note 1, at 113-37 (describing research strategy and design and providing detailed analysis of results of
judicial influence study); The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 667-75 (developing practical
framework for describing and assessing judges' behavior).
44. See The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 684. Likewise, the complexity of the evidence,
as rated throughout the trial, may be helpful in predicting other variables in the model and trial outcome;
see also, Garber et al., supra note 40, at 144-45 (suggesting that bias in the role of extralegal factors
is larger when extralegal factors play a relatively small role in affecting case disposition).
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explore the extent to which jurors base their decisions on the
strength and complexity of the evidence presented at trial.
Studies of courtroom behavior typically do not include a measure
of the strength or quality of the evidence because this information
is often costly to compile."
45. See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 1-18 (1987) (commenting that in majority of cases studied, jurors base their verdicts more
heavily on evidence and law than on extralegal variables). The Stanford Study did not explore the
strength and complexity of the evidence because that study focused primarily on the impact of judges'
communicative behavior on juries. Likewise, the main focus of The American Jury research was on
describing (1) the impact of extralegal information in the 25% of the cases in which there was judge/jury
disagreement, and (2) how such information accounts for their finding that, in the vast majority of these
cases where disagreemeht occurred, the jury was more lenient than the judge. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
note 10, at 55-65.
46. See Garber et al., supra note 40, at 140 (noting that the quality and strength of the evidence
plays an important role in the decision to prosecute, the choice of plea, and trial conviction).
The Iowa Study measures the relative strength of the evidence, in terms of evidentiary support for
a guilty or not guilty verdict in bench trials. Ratings of the evidence are made at the conclusion of the
trial. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18; cf JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY
JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 182-83 (1977) (differing results
between archival study focusing on quality of evidence and present study of ratings of actual evidence).
Other researchers have explored the impact of the strength of the evidence on jury decision making. In
one study, mock jurors were presented with several independent charges against a defendant. Norbert
L. Kerr & Gary W. Sawyers, Independence of Multiple Verdicts Within a Trial by Mock Jurors, 10
REPRESENTATIVE RES. IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 16 (1979). The strength of the evidence for each charge was
varied experimentally. The results show that as the strength of the evidence toward guilt is increased
on one charge, the mock jurors are less likely to find guilt on the other charge. The researchers interpret
the results as attempts by the mock jurors to produce verdicts that would be equitable to the defendant.
In another study, mock jurors were presented with either strong or weak evidence in a murder case.
Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral
Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973). These jurors were presented also with additional
evidence that was ruled as either admissible or inadmissible. The findings show that jurors in the weak
("close") evidence condition are relatively more biased by the inadmissible evidence in their decision
making. Conversely, jurors in the strong evidence condition are not biased by the inadmissible evidence
and produce more guilty verdicts. These findings parallel suggestions here that in close or marginal
cases, extralegal factors, such as the judges' communicative behavior, independently influence trial
outcomes and sentencing. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (noting the results for "C-D"
chain). The Sue et al. study also found that jurors in the strong evidence condition showed greater
confidence in their subsequent verdicts. Cf infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (regarding "C'-C"
results).
In sum, the Iowa Study explores the strength and complexity of the evidence and its relationship to
other variables in the model. The study analyzes in actual trials what Kalven and Zeisel call the
importance of "sentiments" in close cases. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 111-12, 165 (suggesting
that closeness of evidence in a case makes it possible for the jury to respond to sentiment or intuitive
feelings "by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence" (emphasis in original)). Kalven and Zeisel
suggest that jury (or, by implication, judicial) sentiments about the defendant (e.g., empathy with the
defendant) or about the law (e.g., fairness of the law) may provide additional insight into the reasons
for decision making in close cases.
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"D": outcome variables
The model measures ultimate trial outcome by the judge's
(e.g., in a bench trial) or jury's finding of guilt or innocence. Trial
outcome is predicted by several combinations of variables in the
model. 7
"E": judge/jury agreement/disagreement variables
This variable assesses the magnitude of the agreement or
disagreement between judge and jury regarding trial outcome.48
The "E" variable is not tested in the Iowa Study of bench trials.
"F": sentence imposed variable
This variable assesses the magnitude of the sentence for a
particular charge.4 9 Judges retain discretion in the sentencing
process,50 often considering individual and community perceptions
of the crime, the background of the criminal, and the circumstances
of the case.5' The model assesses the impact of defendants'
background, behavior, and culpability factors on the sentencing
process. 2 Analyses of these relationships allow for assessment of
47. See infra notes 82-84, 89-90, 93-98, 135, 149-51, 159-61, 170-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the results of simple relationships in the model where one variable is trial outcome). In the
Stanford Study, for instance, defendants with more severe criminal histories were more likely to be
found guilty, while those with less severe criminal histories were more likely to be acquitted. The
Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 129; see supra text accompnaying note 82.
48. In the Stanford Study, this variable assessed the judge's attitude about the trial process and
outcome after the jury reached its verdict.
49. A large number of empirical studies on sentencing patterns and behavior have been conducted.
See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM 372-99 (2d ed. 1991)
(reviewing empirical studies). See generally FrrzMAURICE & PEASE, supra note 13 (reporting
comparative study of the psychology of sentencing).
50. See generally Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Meeting Congresional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.. 393 (1991).
51. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 49, at 373. Future study of judges' discretion in the sentencing
process is warranted, given the recently revised sentencing guidelines. See infra notes 280-88 and
accompanying text (discussing future research on sentencing).
52. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 49, at 378-80 (noting impact of judges' age, experience, previous
employment as district attorney, political party membership, and philosophy of punishment as predictors
of magnitude of sentence imposed).
Ebbesen and Konecni observed more than 400 sentencing hearings to study empirically the factors
that influence judges' sentencing decisions. Ebbe 3. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, The Process of
Sentencing Adult Felons: A CausalAnalysis of Judicial Decisions (providing empirical analysis of eight
judges' sentencing behaviors and patterns), in THE TRIAL PROCESS 413, 431-58 (Brnce D. Sales ed.,
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the degree to which judges' sentencing decisions are independent
of legal or extralegal factors.5 3
"G": competence and influence of participants variable
The model explores how the perceived competence or
influence of different trial participants (e.g., judge or counsel)
relates to other variables in the model, such as trial outcome or
sentencing patterns.5 4
II. THE STANFORD STUDY: TESTING THE MODEL IN JURY TRIALS
This Part highlights the findings from the Stanford Study of judges'
behavior in criminal jury trials. Section A summarizes the Stanford findings
from the videotaped analyses of judges' communicative behavior and
discusses their relevance to the development of the on-line55 coding of legal
1981). Similar to the approach of the model here, Ebbesen and Konecni sought to isolate the factors that
accounted for the systematic variation among judges' sentences. Four factors accounted for the vast
majority of variation in sentencing, which may also be employed in subsequent tests of our model,
including: (1) the type of crime; (2) the defendant's criminal history; (3) the status of the defendant
between arrest and conviction (e.g., released on bail or held in jail); and (4) the probation officer's
sentence recommendation. Of these factors, judges followed the recommended sentence of the probation
officer in 84% of the cases studied. Ebbesen and Konecni concluded that the probation officer's
recommendation is likely based on the other variables studied; that is, based on a knowledge of the
defendants' criminal histories ("A" variable in our model) and on perceptions of the seriousness of the
crime (potential "A" variable in our model). See also WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 53, at 382 (suggesting
this is one reason why, in this study, judges' agreement with probation officers' recommendations were
so high). Future tests of the model may also incorporate the sentencing recommendation of the probation
officer as an additional post-verdict variable. See Shari Diamond, Exploring Sources of Sentence
Disparity (providing empirical analysis of variables predicting judges' sentencing behaviors and
patterns), in THE TRIAL PROCESS, supra, at 387.
53. See Sue et al., supra note 46, at 352 (noting that sentencing judgments should not be related
to jurors' degree of confidence in their verdicts); see also Hagan & Bumiller, supra note 6, at 10-18
(describing methodological difficulties in sentencing research, such as alternative measures of sentence
severity and sampling problems).
54. Peter D. Blanck & Robert Rosenthal, Mediation of Interpersonal Expectancy Effects:
Counselor's Tone of Voice, 76 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 418 (1984). In these studies, less competent and less
effective counselors were more prone to biasing effects, talking more negatively about others of
perceived low potential and more positively (e.g., more warmly) about others of perceived high
potential. More competent and interpersonally more effective individuals treated others of perceived high
and low potential more equally. Similarly, in our work with psychotherapists, therapists' nonverbal
behavior, as expressed only in tone of voice, is rated as significantly less anxious when they are rated
as more competent by their supervisors. Peter D. Blanck et al., Talking to and About Patients: The
Therapists' Tone of Voice, in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN THE CLINICAL CONTExT 99, 129 (Peter
D. Blanck et al. eds., 1986).
55. The term "on-line" refers to the observing and recording of trial information by those present
at the trial.
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and extralegal measures in the Iowa Study. Section B highlights the simple
relationships and Section C the cumulative relationships among the variables
in the model explored in the Stanford Study.
A. Global and Micro Dimensions of Judges' Behavior
This Section describes the Stanford findings for judges' global styles and
micro nonverbal behaviors in relating to their juries.56 The findings provide
the foundation for the on-line test of the model in the Iowa courts. Global
style refers to the dimensions of judges' communicative and interpersonal
behavior that are often conveyed independently of verbal content.57 Although
a particular global style may reflect a judge's orientation for relating to others
during the trial, a judge may show different global styles at different times
depending on the circumstances of the trial process. For example, when
responding to improper attorney behavior, a judge might show more directive
or controlling behavior. Conversely, when dealing with a child witness, a
judge might show more caring and patient behavior.
The Stanford Study is the first to delineate the dimensions of trial judges'
global styles. The ahalyses yield four global dimensions of behavior: (1)
"judicial," (2) "directive," (3) "confident," and (4) "warm. '58 These
dimensions may be delineated further into those that appear more legally or
procedurally oriented, as reflected by the judicial and directive dimensions,
and those that appear more emotionally based, as reflected by the confident
.and warm global dimensions.
59
Analyses of the Stanford videotapes led to four preliminary conclusions
about the "appearance" of judges' global dimensions of behavior:
56. Detailed statistical analyses and tables of the preliminary findings for the simple relationships
of the variables in the model are described in The Appearance ofJustice, supra note 1, at 119-136; The
Measure of the Judge, supra note I, at 672-74.
57. See Blanck et al., supra note 54, at 99-143 (providing overview of research program that
analyzed five areas of interpersonal communication: descriptive, psychometric, interactional, competence,
and trans-situational factors); Peter D. Blanck et al., Therapists' Tone of Voice: Descriptive,
Psychometric, Interactional, and Competence Analyses, 4 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 154, 155-75
(1986) (summarizing research program on therapists' tone of voice); see also Figure 1, supra text
accompanying note 40 (summarizing research model).
58. See The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 657-62 (discussing principal components
statistical methodology to analyze judges' behavior in more useful and practical ways by reducing
number of variables to describe such behavior); see also EIsENsTEIN & JACOB, supra note 46, at 24-28
(proposing four organizational goals that reflect the degree of adversarialness, judges' behavior, and
patterns of case disposition: reducing conflict, avoiding uncertainty, processing cases, doing justice; these
goals may relate to the four global styles, respectively: warm, confident, directive, and judicial).
59. The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 661-66.
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(1) A high rating on the judicial dimension indicates that the judge
was perceived as professional, wise, competent, and honest. The judicial
dimension is focused, perhaps in the broadest sense, on the appearance of
judicial propriety and fairness."
(2) A high rating on the directive dimension indicates that the judge
was perceived as more dogmatic and dominant. The directive dimension
typifies the qualities of the trial judge as a courtroom manager and as an
administrator.6
(3) A high rating on the confident dimension indicates that the judge
was perceived as less anxious and less hostile. This dimension reflects the
extent to which the judge appears emotionally comfortable, self-assured,
and patient with others during the trial.62
(4) A high rating on the warm dimension indicates that the judge was
perceived as more open-minded and empathic. This dimension reflects the
extent to which the judge appears to be supportive of, and courteous
toward, the trial participants. 63
The global dimensions help to predict other measures in the model; for
instance, trial outcomes or judges' expectations. They also reflect interpretable
and externally valid dimensions of judges' communicative styles that are
consistent with prior case-oriented and clinically derived descriptions of
judges' behavior.'
The Stanford Study also explored the micro nonverbal behaviors of trial
judges. Examples of judges' micro behaviors include amount of eye contact
with trial participants and frequency of smiles, hand movements, or head
60. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483-84 (1986) (describing core values of procedural due
process to include "appearance" of an independent and fair adjudicator).
61. The "directive" dimension is similar to other case-study descriptions of so-called "managerialjudging" techniques. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 380, 445 (1982)
(criticizing more active, managerial stance of judges and advocating a return to the classical judicial
role); cf Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 505, 505-
22 (1984) (criticizing Resnik's article for overstating the extent of judicial activity that is inconsistent
with due process and for employing questionable approaches with established and acceptable practices
and models in conducting her study). Future research should explore the relationship between judges'
behavior and their methods and styles of case management.
62. The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 662-65 (noting that a "confident" judge frames
commands in the form of pleasant requests and is respectful of trial participants).
63. The "warn" dimension is consistent with the style of positive regard for others advocated by
the client-centered therapeutic school first advanced by Carl Rogers. See The Measure of the Judge,
supra note 1, at 665-66 (describing analysis of therapeutic interaction and warm dimension).
64. The National Conference of State Trial Judges describes the essential qualities of a good judge
as including: graciousness, moral courage, reputation for fairness, mercy, patience, ability to
communicate, decisiveness, innovation, open-mindedness, brevity, dignity, honesty, and integrity. THE
JUDGE'S BOOK 31-38 (National Conference of State Trial Judges ed., 1989).
1134 [Vol. 68:1119
CALIBRATING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
nods. 65 The micro behaviors assessed have been employed in studies of
psychotherapy as well as in other studies of courtroom processes.66
The Stanford Study demonstrates the predictive relationship between global
styles and micro behaviors, highlighting the potential methodological
contribution of the model.67 The Stanford Study provides preliminary
evidence that judges' micro behaviors alone predict with practical benefit
those same judges' global styles.68 The results show, for instance, that more
engaged micro behaviors by the judge, such as eye contact and head nods
directed at the jury, predict those same judges' judicial and directive global
styles. Similarly, less engaged micro behaviors by the judge, such as less
postural attention, predict those same judges' warm global style toward their
juries.69
The findings suggest methodological and economical shortcuts for
researchers, courts, and practitioners interested in studying judges' behavior,
attitudes, and decision making "on-line" during actual trials.7° Even moderate
relationships between the readily quantifiable micro behaviors and the more
impressionistic global styles are of value to social scientists, legal researchers,
65. See infra appendix B. Like the findings for the four global dimensions, the Stanford Study
provided a practical description of two basic constellations ofjudges' micro behavior. A first component
of "engaged" micro behaviors emerged, with judges rated high on this component displaying more eye
contact, more postural attention, and less self-touching. A second component of "emotional" micro
behaviors emerged, with judges rated high on this component displaying more smiles, head nods, hand
movements, and forward leans. The two micro constellations are conceptually similar to the "judicial"
and "wann" global dimensions of judges' behavior.
66. See generally The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1; see also Gordon D. Hemsley & Anthony
N. Doob, The Effect ofLooking Behavior on Perceptions of a Communicator's Credibility, 8 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 136 (1978) (rating witness less credible if he or she failed to maintain eye contact with
lawyer); Bert Pryor & Charner Leone, BehavioralStereotypes ofDeceptive Communication, TRIAL, June
1981, at 14, 14-19, 70 (finding less eye contact, more backward leans, trunk swivel, leg movement, self-
touching, gesturing, and speech errors associated with witnesses' attempts at deception).
For a review of the predictive value of micro behaviors in the courtroom context, see The Measure
of the Judge, supra dote I, at 667-69.
. 67. See The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 674; see also supra notes 57-64 and
accompanying text (discussing global dimensions of judges' behavior).
68. This suggestion echoes the large body of research demonstrating, for instance, the important
effects of eye contact on social influence and credibility in courtroom testimony. The Measure of the
Judge, supra note 1, at 674-75.
69. Id. at 673-74.
70. Id. This is true even where, as in the Stanford Study, analysis involves a relatively small sample
of judges, all of whom knew that they were being videotaped and assessed by a naive group of
observers. Moreover, the findings are particularly encouraging given the brief length of the judges'
behavior that was rated. See Nalini Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Thin Slicis of Expressive Behavior




courts, and practitioners. 71 This is because the logistical and ethical problems
often associated with videotaping and coding actual trials to assess judges'
behavior are minimized.72 Thus, researchers and court observers may use the
more easily observed micro behaviors as an index of judges' global styles.73
B. Simple Relationships in the Model
The model in the Stanford Study generated simple relationships that are
summarized by the correlation between any two variables in the model. The
model also generated cumulative relationships that are summarized by two or
more variables predicting a third variable using multiple regression analyses.
The Stanford findings are summarized next as a point for comparison with the
findings of the Iowa Study that are set forth in Part IV below.74
71. See The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 676 (proposing ways in which the model and
its results could be used in appellate review or as a training tool to modify judges' behavior); see also
Blanck et al., supra note 54, at 127-29, 131-33 (detailing analogous line of study showing predictive
value of micro behaviors in psychotherapeutic context).
72. See generally Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Searchfor Justice?
Keynote Address: The Impact of Television on the Jury System: Ancient Myths and Modern Realism,
The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, May 11, 1990, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 623 (1991)
(statement of Fred Graham) [hereinafter Keynote Address]; see also INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS,
supra note 41, at 349-51 (discussing logistical and ethical problems associated with videotaping trials);
Blanck & Turner, supra note 30, at 109-23 (stating that clinical field research is intervention that
inevitably alters behavior and attitudes observed and recorded).
73. See Blanck & Turner, supra note 30, at 113-15 (delineating micro behaviors studied and coding
scheme attached to such behaviors). The long-term goal of the on-line coding system is to also explore
the effectiveness of the model when employed'by training or educational programs for judges devoted
to the fine-grain videotape or on-line analysis of courtroom behavior. See generally infra part V; The
Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 674.
74. In the presentation of the preliminary findings, statistical significance is indexed by a probability
that an observation would have been found if, in the population from which we sampled, the true
correlation were zero. We typically present probability values (p) of.10 or less because these values are
useful in assessing the types of variables under study here. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note
1, at 119-20 n.98.
In exploring the simple relationships of the model, we employ correlational analyses. The correlation
coefficient (r) can take on values between -1.00 and +1.00. A value of -1.00 means that there is a
perfect negative relationship, a value of+l.00 means there is a perfect positive relationship, and a value
of .00 means that there is no linear relationship between the two variables in the model. Correlational
analyses describe the predictive relationship between two variables but do not isolate the "causes" and
"effects" of that relationship.
In exploring the complex relationships of the model, we employ multiple regression analyses. The
Multiple R, or R2, represents the relationship between a particular variable in the model (the criterion
variable) and the set of predictor variables in the model. R2 takes on values only between 0 and 1, with
the former indicating no relationship and the latter indicating a perfect relationship between the
variables. The F and t tests describe the level of confidence that the linear relationship between the
criterion and predictor variables is not zero in the population. The dfrefers to the "degrees of freedom"
required for statistical significance testing. See The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 669.
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1. Background-Expectancy Relationships
This relationship describes how a judge's expectations for trial outcome
may be predicted solely from the background variables of the trial partici-
pants. The Stanford Study suggests, for instance, that judges' beliefs about
trial outcomes are related in predictable ways to defendants' criminal
histories. Judges tend to expect a guilty verdict when defendants have more
serious criminal histories and judges expect not guilty verdicts when
defendants have less serious criminal histories.75 Also, the Stanford Study
shows a trend for judges to infer guilt when defendants are of a lower
socioeconomic status. 76 These results suggest that although the background
characteristics of defendants should have no legal bearing on guilt or
innocence, they may influence judges' expectations for trial outcomes.
2. Background-Behavior Relationships
This relationship describes how defendants' background variables relate to
judges' global and micro behaviors during trial. The Stanford Study shows
that information about a defendant's criminal history, information that the jury
is ordinarily not allowed to learn unless the defendant takes the stand to
testify, relates to judges' behavior when instructing their juries.77 When
delivering instructions for defendants with more serious criminal histories,
judges' overt, verbal behavior is perceived as more judicial, directive, and
warm,78 but their nonverbal behavior is seen as relatively less judicial,
directive, and warm. 79 The Stanford Study also shows that there is a
tendency for raters to perceive judges' nonverbal behavior when delivering
jury instructions as more professional and competent when defendants are of
a higher socioeconomic status.80 These results suggest that judges may
sometimes "leak" or reveal to juries their underlying beliefs about defendants
through nonverbal channels alone.8
75. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 120-21 (illustrating how defendants' prior
records may affect judges' expectations for conviction or acquittal).
76. Id. at 121.
77. Id. at 121-24.
78. See id. at 122 (describing the correlation between judges' communication styles and the
seriousness of defendants' criminal histories).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 128.
81. See id. at 122-24 (detailing study results that support the theory that judges reveal personal




Defendants' criminal histories tend to be related to trial outcomes:
defendants with more serious criminal histories are more likely to be found
guilty. 2 Additionally, defendants of higher socioeconomic status received
more guilty verdicts than defendants of lower socioeconomic status. 3 These
results, viewed in combination with the tendency for the Stanford Study
judges to nonverbally reveal criminal history, indicate that defendants'
background variables might influence judges and juries more than many
commentators previously assumed. 4
4. Background-Sentence Relationships
This relationship was not tested in the Stanford Study. It describes,
however, the extent to which background variables predict the magnitude of
the sentence imposed by the judge. The magnitude of the judge's sentence
often will properly reflect the relevant criminal history of the defendant. 5
The analyses in the Iowa Study focus on other extralegal variables, such as
the age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status of the defendant. There is no
82. See id. at 129 (providing statistical correlation between guilty verdicts and criminal histories);
see also McElhaney, supra note 40 (noting that the most important decision for a defendant with prior
convictions is whether to take the stand at trial).
83. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 130 n.l 17. This was especially true for the first
count against the defendant. Id.
84. See id. at 130. Note also the background-judge/jury agreement ("A-E") relationship: This
relationship describes how background variables may relate to the judge's views about the trial
outcome-in the Stanford Study, about the jury verdict. Tests of this relationship suggest a slight trend
for judges' disagreement with their juries' verdicts to be stronger when defendants had more serious
criminal histories. Simple correlation for this relationship is r = -.16, not significant atp .10. But this
relationship may prove more apparent when assessed in the context of multiple regression analyses. See
infra note 100 and accompanying text. We hypothesize, but have not yet tested, that in cases where the
judge knows the defendant's prior criminal history and the jury does not, the judge will view a jury
verdict of innocence to be overly lenient. This suggestion is consistent with Kalven and Zeisel's
conclusion in The American Jury that in cases of judgejury disagreement, juries tended to be viewed
as more lenient than judges. See infra note 99.
85. Insufficient data are available from the Stanford Study to test the relationship between
defendants' criminal history and sentencing patterns. The Iowa Study also involved an insufficient
number of defendants with prior criminal histories. See infra text accompanying note 112. Therefore,
future study is needed to address this question, although archival analyses could be performed on
existing data to address this issue.
For a review of research on sentencing patterns, see generally Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 52
(suggesting that the relation between defendants' criminal histories and perceptions of the seriousness
of the crime is predictive of judges' sentences). An interesting subset of cases to study further are those
in which the defendant does not take the stand to testify. For this subset of cases, one might expect that
defendants receive relatively lighter sentences. This finding should be particularly apparent in cases
where the judge's initial expectations are for a not guilty verdict.
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reason a priori to believe that extralegal background variables of the
defendants or other trial participants should relate systematically to the
magnitude of the sentence imposed by the judge. The existence of such a
relationship would suggest potential bias and reversible error on the part of
the trial judge. 6
5. Expectancy-Behavior Relationships
These relationships describe how judges' expectations for trial outcomes
relate to their global and micro behaviors. The Stanford findings suggest that
judges may reveal their beliefs to their juries through nonverbal channels
alone. For instance, judges expecting a guilty verdict tend to be somewhat less
judicial and warm in relating to their juries.87 These results imply, but do not
prove, that judges' verbal and nonverbal channels may convey messages
concerning defendants' guilt or innocence.
88
6. Expectancy-Outcome Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' expectations for trial outcomes
relate to actual trial outcomes. The Stanford findings suggest that judges'
expectations for trial outcomes (as assessed by the judges themselves) do not
accurately predict actual trial outcomes.89 The Iowa Study revisits this issue
by employing independent observers to make assessments, at different points
during the trial, of judges' expectations for guilt or innocence.90
86. For a discussion of reversible and harmless error, see infra notes 22740 and accompanying text.
87. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 130-31.
88. Intentionally or unintentionally, judges' beliefs may influence their verbal and nonverbal
communication styles when relating to their juries, although on the written trial transcript or in response
to a pencil-and-paper questionnaire, the judges may "appear' (or actually believe themselves to be)
impartial. The jurors in the Stanford Study generally failed to report that the judges' nonverbal behavior
conveyed the judges' expectations about what the trial outcomes should be. Id.; INTERPERSONAL
EXPECTATIONS, supra note 41, at 342 (analyzing research process).
89. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note I, at 132-33. The simple correlation for this
relationship is r = -.20, which is not significant atp < .10, but suggests a trnd that expectations may
be related to outcomes in predictable ways. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing results
of Iowa Study).
Nevertheless, the Stanford Study findings suggest that judges who send "expectancy effects" to juries
should be held accountable, because biasing messages (at least as assessed by our methods) might not
be an inevitable product of courtroom dynamics. INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS, supra note 41, at 342.
Empirical testing of the cumulative impact of the model (e.g., "A-B-C-E" predicting the "D" chain) is
necessary to understand this relationship more completely.
90. Note that the expectancy-judge/jury agreement ("B-E") relationships are not tested in the Iowa
Study. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. This relationship describes how judges' expectations




The Stanford Study did not test this relationship. The Iowa Study explores
the extent to which the magnitude of the sentence reflects the expectations
formed by the judge during the trial about the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. 9' A finding may reflect impermissible bias when it shows a strong
relationship between a judge's preconceptions for guilt during trial-an
extralegal factor-and the magnitude of the sentence subsequently imposed by
that same judge.92
8. Behavior-Outcome Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' behavior alone may predict trial
verdicts.9 The Stanford results suggest a trend for judges' globai styles to
be less judicial and directive and their micro behaviors to be significantly
more engaged when the jury reached a guilty verdict.94 The Iowa Study
again tests the extent to which judges' behavior predicts trial outcomes.95
The Iowa Study also enables the study of behavior, evidence, and outcome in
verdicts. Those judges expedting a guilty verdict prior to the trial outcome would probably be more
likely to agree with a jury verdict of guilt than with a verdict of innocent. In the Stanford Study, the
simple correlation for this relationship is r = -.39, p < .05. Judges who are convinced early in the trial
that the defendant is guilty may likely reflect or "confirm" this attitude in the subsequent magnitude of
their agreement with the jury's verdict. Moreover, the strength of the "B-E" relationship may be
moderated by the severity of the defendant's criminal history, by the magnitude of the judge's
expectations, and by whether or not the defendant testified. This suggestion would parallel Kalven and
Zeisel's view in The American Jury that in cases where the judge has some knowledge of the
defendant's criminal history that the jury does not have, the judge and jury may in fact be trying two
different cases. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 121. In other words, had the jury known what the
judge knew, it would likely have agreed with the judge.
91. See generally Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 52 (attempting to discern the decision-making
strategies judges employ in matching sentencing options with individual offenders).
92. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
93. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 133-36 (documenting study results showing
correlation between judges' behavior and jury verdicts).
94. See id. at 135. Further, simple correlation for the relationship between judges' engaged micro
behavior (e.g., more eye contact) and trial outcome is r = .28, p < .10.
95. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. Rosenthal summarized the results of the Stanford
Study. "(I]f a judge believed a particular defendant to be guilty, sixty-four percent of the jurors found
the defendant guilty. If the judge believed the defendant innocent, then only forty-nine percent of the
jurors reported guilty. There was a fifteen difference (between sixty-four percent and forty-nine percent)
that was, in a sense, in the mind and expectation of the judge." Panel One, supra note 3, at 1043
(statement of Robert Rosenthal). These results suggest that the judges may have conveyed their
expectations through nonverbal channels to their juries.
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marginal and close cases.96 The addition of the "C"' variable thus enables an
analysis of the strength of the evidence as a predictor of trial outcomes and
of other trial process variables.97 For example, in close cases in which the
evidence toward guilt is relatively weak, judges' beliefs and behavior,
defendants' background variables, or other extralegal factors likely play a
relatively more important role in predicting trial outcomes.98
9. Behavior-Sentence Relationships
This relationship describes the extent to which judges' global and micro
behaviors at trial predict the imposition of more severe sentences. The Iowa
Study provides a new avenue for study given the relative logistical ease with
which judges' global and micro behaviors can be assessed.99
96. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 133-36. One encouraging general conclusion from
the Stanford Study is that, in most cases where the judges' expectations for trial outcomes are conveyed
to juries either verbally or nonverbally, jurors still tended to make their own independent assessments
of the evidence. See infra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 181, 184 and accompanying text.
98. See infra part IV.B.2 (presenting partial correlational analyses controlling for the strength of the
evidence); cf. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 134-35 (analyzing evidence in terms of "close" and
"clear" cases).
Note also the behavior-judge/jury agreement ("C-E") relationship, which describes how a judge's
global styles and micro behaviors at trial may predict (or be predicted by) that judge's views about the
trial outcome. Preliminary tests of this relationship in the Stanford Study suggest a trend indicating that
judges' engaged micro behaviors are related to their views about trial outcome. Although the simple
correlation between the "C" and "E" variables was not significant, the partial correlations derived from
exploratory multiple regression analyses suggested a strong relationship: partial r = .26, p < .04. This
relationship supports the suggestion that judges' behavior alone may reflect their views about the
perceived "correctness" of their jury's ultimate conclusion.
99. The outcome-judge/jury agreement ("D-E") relationship explored in the Stanford Study showed
that trial outcome is predicted by a knowledge of the magnitude ofjudges' agreement/disagreement with
their juries' verdicts. Simple correlation for this relationship is r = .63,p < .01. Judges are more likely
to agree with guilty verdicts and to disagree with not guilty verdicts. On its face, this result supports
Kalven and Zeisel's general conclusion that judges tend to view jury results as more lenient than their
own. Further research is being conducted to isolate this result, given that in our research (unlike that of
The American Jury) the judges completed the questionnaires both before and after they had knowledge
of the jury's verdict. Kalven and Zeisel recognized that a possible source of methodological bias existed
in their study because they could not be sure that their participating judges completed the questionnaire
responses'before actually hearing their jury's verdict. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 52. It
will be interesting to explore the extent to which our results parallel those of Kalven and Zeisel's, given
the different methods. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 157-58.
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C. Cumulative Relationships in the Model
The model is most powerful and predictive when examining combinations
of variables. Multiple regression analyses are used to explore cumulative
effects in the model. Regression analyses enable detailed assessments of the
relationship between a set of independent predictor variables with one
criterion (i.e., dependent) variable in the model.'
The Stanford Study employed several variables in the model as predictors
of trial outcome. One combination tested the extent to which trial outcomes
are predicted by the set of variables, including defendants' criminal histories,
judges' expectations for trial outcome, engaged micro behaviors of the judges,
and magnitude of judge/jury agreement/disagreement as to verdict. Initial
results suggest that judges' expectations, judges' engaged micro behavior, and
judge/jury agreement together predict trial outcomes better than any single
variable in the model alone.'
Similarly, the Iowa Study uses regression analyses to explore the "A-B-C-
C"' chain to predict trial outcome and sentencing. The analyses illustrate how
study of other combinations of variables shed light on the long-standing
observation that legal and extralegal factors influence trial outcomes and
sentencing. Additionally, despite the growing tendency to videotape and
televise actual trials,"0 2 the Iowa test of the model illustrates how research-
ers, courts, and practitioners may systematically calibrate on-line courtroom
behavior. Thus, the model may be useful for assessing courtroom behavior
through videotape or on-line -analyses tested in the Stanford and Iowa
Studies. 3 As Part V suggests, videotape and on-line analyses may become
100. For a review of multiple regression techniques, see JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED
MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7 (2d ed. 1983)
(explaining that multiple regression analyses describe the relationships between a complex set of
predictor variables and a single criterion variable). The term "cumulative chain," as used herein, is meant
to describe the additive relationship of the variables and is not meant to have statistical relevance.
101. R2 for this complex relationship = .7420, F = 20.10, df(3, 30), p < .0001. For this equation,
partial r for "B" variable = .67, p < .001; for "C" variable = .39, p < .05; and for "E" variable = .64,
p < .001. Partial r for "A" variable in this chain =.25,p = .17.
102. See generally Keynote Address, supra note 72 (describing efforts to make trial proceedings
available through television).
103. But see Thomas Grisso et al., Standards in Research, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 758, 762 (1991)
(providing reasons why research psychologists should proceed with extreme caution when employing
videotaped data); Peter D. Blanck, The "Process" of Field Research in the Courtroom: A Descriptive
Analysis, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349-51 (1987) (discussing due process problems and concerns
of disruption to the trial process when videotaping trials for research purposes); Peter D. Blanck et al.,
Scientific Rewards and Conflicts of Ethical Choices in Human Subjects Research, 47 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 959 (1992) (viewing research ethics not as an affront to the integrity of sound research but as
presenting an opportunity for scientific rewards).
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standard tools in the calibration of the permissible limits of judges' behavior
and of trial error. Such calibrations would not be possible through analysis of
the written transcript or trial record alone.
0 4
III. THE IOWA STUDY: TESTING THE MODEL IN BENCH TRIALS
The Iowa Study explores: (1) the legal and extralegal factors that influence
decision making in bench trials; (2) the import to the model of the strength
of the evidence variable; (3) judges' behavior over the course of entire bench
trials, rated at several points and involving interactions with different trial
participants;0 5 and (4) the validity and practical value of on-line coding for
assessing trial outcomes and sentencing.0 6
A. Research Strategy and Design: Trials and Participants
Trials. The study was conducted in the Johnson County Magistrate Court
in Iowa. A magistrate presided over each of fifty-two trials that were studied
during a twenty-week period. 7 Three magistrates, two men and one
woman, participated in the study. The three magistrates were studied in
twenty-one, seventeen, and fourteen trials, respectively, for a total of fifty-two
trials.
The charges in the trials included public intoxication, failure to maintain
control of a vehicle, speeding, assault, and theft.' 8 Of the fifty-two trials
studied, forty-one resulted in guilty verdicts (79%) and eleven in not guilty
verdicts (21%). For those defendants receiving guilty verdicts, twelve
104. The present study also furthers the analysis of trial processes by testing the psychometric value
(reliability, consistency, and validity) of on-line coding methods. See infra appendix C. Another step
in the test of the model will be to validate the degree to which videotape and on-line analyses predict
trial outcome and other measures in the same trials.
105. Cf Panel One, supra note 3, at 1045-47 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell) (discussing the
importance of studying trial judges' behavior when interacting with counsel and witnesses).
106. See infra appendix C; see also The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 113-14 (discussing
internal and external validity and practical value of courtroom research). The data for the Iowa Study
were collected in conjunction with Christopher Traynor, A Study of Magistrates in Bench Trials (1991)
(unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, University of Iowa). The magistrate court proved to be a cost-
effective site for the test of the extended model in bench trials. The trials studied lasted approximately
one hour and, typically, four trials were scheduled each day.
107. Data is presented and tested for all trials except where it is not available, in which analyses the
sample size, or "n," is presented and tested as less than 52. Magistrates are referred to throughout this
Article as trial judges or judges.
108. The breakdown of the charges are: 33% (17) failure to maintain control of vehicle, 31% (16)
speeding, 6% (3) assault, 10% (5) theft, and 20% (10) other (such as public intoxication and criminal
trespass). See infra note 195 (discussing need for future analyses on seriousness of offense).
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defendants (29%) were awarded the maximum sentence or scheduled
penalty.'0 9 The typical maximum sentence for the first charge in the trials
was thirty days in jail or a $100 fine."0
Defendants. Seventy-nine percent of the defendants were men. The average
age of the defendants was twenty-seven years, with a range of twenty to fifty
years. Defendants' socioeconomic status ranged from low (14%) to medium
(81%) to high (6%). Only two cases involved defendants with prior
criminal histories; therefore the Iowa Study did not test this background
variable.
Lawyers. Counsel for the state either worked for the district attorney's
office or were legal interns. About half of the prosecution counsel were men
(44%), and half were women (56%). Most defense counsel were men (88%).
The majority of defendants, however, represented themselves." 2
B. Research Strategy and Design: On-Line Ratings of the Trials
Two independent observers conducted the on-line coding of each trial." 3
Each observer watched and coded an entire trial, with coordination between
the observers as to the timing of the ratings. The first five minutes of several
109. The sentence variable ("F") is calculated by dividing the sentence received by the maximum
possible sentence for that charge. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. Other findings for
magnitude of sentence are: 5% received half the maximum sentence, 10% received additional penalties
beyond the maximum sentence, and the remaining defendants received lesser sentences. The analyses
were conducted only for the first major charge against the defendant. See infra appendix B (trial data
collection measures).
110. In many cases, the "scheduled fine" is typically the imposition of the $100 penalty.
11. Cf EiSENSTTEN & JACOB, supra note 46, at 181-82 (discussing measurement problems with
independent variable of socioeconomic status). Police reports are often inaccurate measurements of
socioeconomic status. Another measure of socioeconomic status might be whether the defendant has
retained counsel. Id. at 182.
112. Eighty-five percent (44 of 52) of the defendants represented themselves. Future analyses of the
model will address in greater detail the impact of a pro se defense on trial processes and judge decision
making. Preliminary analyses were conducted separately, however, for trials in which defendants were
pro se and represented by counsel. Results show a higher proportion of guilty verdicts for cases in which
defendants were pro se (Chi Square Test = 4.717, p = .03). Also, judges were rated as expecting more
guilty verdicts for pro se defendants relative to those represented by counsel (t = 3.26, p = .002), and
the strength of evidence was rated as stronger toward guilt in trials involving pro se defendants (t =
-2.74, p = .008). Consistent with the general trends reported below, the magnitude of the sentence
imposed did not relate to pro se cases versus those in which defendants were represented by counsel
(t = -.128, p = .90). The regression models below exclude defense counsel variables because of their
small sample size.
113. Ten individuals, six men and four women, rated the 52 trials. The observers were paired
randomly to view a particular trial. A summarized version of the data collection instrument is provided
in Appendix B.
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critical segments of the trials (e.g., witness testimony, closing arguments, and
deliberations) were coded independently." 4
The on-line rating method enabled the collection of information on the
following variables:
a. Background Variables: age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status of the
defendant, judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney.
b. Expectancy Variables: ratings of the judges' expectations for trial
outcome made at three points during the trial: (1) witness testimony (direct
and cross-examination), (2) closing arguments, and (3) the judges' delibera-
tion periods before sentencing.
c. Communicative Variables: ratings of the judges' seven micro behaviors
and four global styles during: (1) witness testimony,"' (2) closing argu-
ments, and (3) the judges' deliberation periods.
d. Strength/Complexity of Evidence Variables: ratings at the conclusion of
the trial." 6 Observers assessed the strength of the evidence that would lead
a fact finder to reach a decision of guilty or not guilty." 7 Observers
assessed the complexity of the evidence in terms of the legal technicalities,
114. See infra appendix B. The coding of the first five minutes for a segment of the trial reflects the
trend in psychotherapeutic research to sample approximately one to five minutes of the therapist's
speech. The Appearance of Justice, supra note I, at 118 n.97 (citing studies); ROBERT E. PrIrENGER
ET AL., THE FIRST FIvE MINUTEs (1960) (demonstrating the verbal and nonverbal richness of the first
five minutes of the therapeutic interview); see also Ambady & Rosenthal, supra note 70, at 252-70
(showing high accuracy of prediction of social outcomes based on short observations of verbal and
nonverbal expressive behavior); Panel One, supra note 3, at 1043 (statement of Robert Rosenthal)
(discussing Ambady & Rosenthal study). The Iowa Study enables an assessment of the psychometric
factors to be considered in "live" courtroom research. There are many unanswered questions, however,
about the reliability, validity, and consistency of segments of observations of the trial process. The
analyses aid in assessments of how much of judges' behavior, or of other aspects of the trials, must be
studied to generalize with confidence to other behaviors or segments in other trials. The Iowa Study also
enables an analysis of the consistency ofjudges' behavior across the trial segments; for example, during
witness testimony, during closing arguments, and during the deliberation period. Limited data was
available for opening statements, so this segment was not included in the analyses. Finally, the study
enables analyses of trial segments during which judges may be most likely to convey unintended or
intended influence. This line of study may eventually enable the identification of critical points in the
trial during which the behavior of the judge, versus the presentation of the evidence, has a significant
impact on trial outcome or sentencing. See infra notes 225-40 and accompanying text (discussing
appellate court assessment of trial error). -
115. The judges' rulings on objections (e.g., sustained, overruled) were also noted during witness
testimony. See infret appendix B. The results of these observations are not presented herein.
116. The evidentiary ratings were made after the judge determined guilt or innocence. Future study
will need to assess the strength of the evidence during the trial to isolate the effect of trial outcome from
ratings of the evidence.
117. The primary focus of the present analyses is on the strength of the evidence variable.
Subsequent analyses are being conducted related to the complexity and quality of the evidence.
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sophisticated analyses of physical evidence, or specialized knowledge or
opinions of professionals (e.g., physicians or psychologists)."'
e. Outcome Variables: the finding of guilty or not guilty
f. Sentence Imposed Variables: the magnitude of the sentence imposed." 9
g. Competency/Influence of the Trial Participants Variables: ratings at the
end of the trial of judges', counsels', and witnesses' competence and
influence.
IV THE IOWA STUDY: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Part sets forth the findings for the test of the model in Iowa bench
trials. 20 Section A summarizes the results for the simple relationships in the
model. Section B sets forth in greater detail the findings for the cumulative
effects of the legal and extralegal variables.
A. Simple Relationships in the Model
The simple bivariate relationships in the model are explored in this Section.
These relationships are summarized in Figure 1 above.
1. Background-Expectancy Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' expectations for trial outcomes
relate to defendants' extralegal background variables. The findings show that
judges' expectations for guilt are stronger for older defendants, while judges'
expectations for a finding of not guilty tend to be more prevalent for younger
defendants.'"' This finding suggests the usefulness of including the back-
ground variable of defendant age in subsequent cumulative tests of the model.
No other defendant background variables related to judges' expectations for
trial outcomes.' 22
118. Eight of the ten observers were law students, and the other two were senior undergraduate pre-
law majors. All observers were familiarized with the implications of various types of evidence.
119. The magnitude was computed by dividing the actual sentence by the potential maximum
sentence.
120. The analyses of the simple and cumulative relationships in the model are averaged over the
course of entire trials. The results of the psychometric analyses set forth in Appendix C-showing
relatively high observer reliability and consistency-enable the analyses to be averaged over trial
segments. This, in turn, allows for more readily interpretable and practcal assessments of the findings.
121. For this relationship, r = -.23, p = .11, n = 52.
122. Analyses are on file with the author.
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2. Background-Behavior Relationships
This relationship describes how defendant background variables relate to
judges' global and micro behaviors during trial. Several findings are of
interest. First, the defendant's age relates to the judge's behavior: when
defendants are older, judges tend to display less forward leans, 23 yet appear
warmer 124 during trial. Second, the defendant's gender relates to the judge's
behavior: judges tend to display more self-touching behaviors when defen-
dants are male. 25 Interestingly, during trials with male defendants, judges
tend to appear more judicial, 126 directive, 127 warm, 128 and confident. 129
The findings are consistent with the Stanford results suggesting that judges
may sometimes "leak" or reveal to trial participants--defendants and counsel
in the present study-their underlying beliefs or expectations about aspects of
the trial through nonverbal channels alone. 3 The cumulative analyses shed
additional light on the extent to which these judges may leak, through their
global and micro behaviors, expectations for trial outcomes and the effect this
may have on trial outcomes and sentencing.
3. Background-Evidence Relationships
These findings show that the evidence tends to support guilty verdicts more
frequently in trials of older defendants than in trials of younger defen-
dants,' and in trials of female defendants than in trials of male defen-
dants. 3 1 It is possible that the results for defendant age or gender reflect
123. r = -.21,p = .13, n =52.
124. r = .24, p .08, n 52.
125. r = -.24, p =.09, n 52.
126. r = -.22,p =.11, n =52.
127. r = -.24, p .09, n 52.
128. r = -.19, p = .18, n = 52 (suggesting a trend).
129. r = -.20, p =.16, n = 52 (suggesting a trend). The small sample size of men (n = 2) and women
(n = 1) judges does not allow for meaningfiul analysis of the relation of judge gender and defendant
gender with communication style of the judge.
130. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 122-24 (detailing study results that support
theory that judges reveal personal opinions to juries through nonverbal communication); see also Allen
J. Hart, On the Sobriety of Judges: Nonverbal Influence in the Courtroom (1991) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, Harvard University) (finding that in mock jury trial scenarios, biased judicial behavior
influenced jurors to return verdicts in same direction as judges' bias and to be more confident in their
verdicts when they agreed with the judges' bias).
131. r - -.34,p = .02, n = 52.




societal biases or the gender role socialization of the observers them-
selves.' 3 Further study of the relation between the perceived and actual
strength of the evidence and trial participants' background variables is
warranted. The present findings imply that, although several of the back-
ground characteristics of defendants should have no legal bearing on the fact-
finder's perception of the evidence or of ultimate guilt, background variables




This relationship shows that older defendants are more likely to receive
guilty verdicts, and younger defendants are more likely to receive not-guilty
verdicts. 35 The relative impact of defendant age and gender, as central
background variables in the model, is discussed further in the multivariate
analyses.
5. Background-Sentence Relationships
This relationship describes how defendant background variables relate to the
magnitude of the sentence imposed by the judge. Importantly, no significant
relationships are found between defendant age or gender and the magnitude
of the sentence imposed. 36 This nonfinding suggests that the sentencing
patterns of these judges are not predicted solely by defendants' extralegal
factors.
6. Background-Competence/Influence Relationships
In trials of older, as compared to younger, defendants, prosecution counsel
are rated as more competent. 37 Also, in trials of older defendants, defense
133. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 127-28 (discussing findings for gender of trial
judges in Stanford Study).
134. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 119-21 (discussing "A-B" relationship in
Stanford Study); see also infra part V.B & C (discussing research on trial error and sentencing).
135. r = .36, p = .01, n = 52. Although defendant gender was not related significantly to trial
outcome (r =. 15, p = .28, n = 52), the trend shows that women defendants are somewhat more likely
to receive a guilty verdict.
136. For age, r = -.06, p = .72, n = 40. For gender, r = -. 19, p = .24, n = 40 (showing a slight trend
that men received greater magnitude of sentence).
137. r = .23, p =. 10, n = 52. This result is consistent with the pattern of results that older defendants
are more likely to be found guilty. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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counsel tend to be rated as less influential. 38 No such relationships emerge
with defendant gender. However, in trials involving defendants of lower
socioeconomic status, judges are rated as more competent and influential. 39
These findings suggest that defendant age and socioeconomic status might
sometimes relate to perceptions of judges' or counsels' competence or
effectiveness. 140
7. Expectancy-Behavior Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' expectations for trial outcomes
relate to their global and micro behaviors during trial. The findings explore
the suggestion that judges sometimes reveal their beliefs to trial participants
through nonverbal channels alone.' 41 Consistent with the Stanford results,
when judges expect guilty verdicts, they tend to show fewer smiles and
postural changes during trial.'42 The converse is true when judges expect




This tests the relation between judges' expectations and the strength and
complexity of the evidence at trial. Strong predicted relationships emerge.
First, when judges expect guilty verdicts, the strength of the evidence is rated
as strong toward guilt. 44 Conversely, when judges expect not-guilty
verdicts, the evidence is rated as strong toward innocence.
The finding that judges' expectations for trial outcomes relate to the
strength and direction of the evidence suggests that the judges and indepen-
dent observers-who may be analogous to shadow jurors-in this study agree
138. r = -.60, p = .12, n = 8 (Note that this result is based on a small sample size.).
139. r = -.29, p = .04, n = 52; r = -.21, p = .13, n = 52, respectively.
140. Future uses of the model will be directed toward empical assessments of "effective" assistance
of counsel.
141. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 130-31.
142. For smiles, r = .24, p =.10, n = 52. For postural changes, r = .2 1, p = .15, n = 52 (suggesting
only a trend in this direction).
143. The separate results for the trial segments are available from the author. See Junda Woo,
Videotapes Give Appeals Cases New Dimension, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at Bi-B2 (noting that
appeals courts may use videotapes to assess the permissible limits of trial judges' nonverbal behavior);
cf The Appearance ofJustice, supra note 1, at 133-34; Bella M. DePaulo, Nonverbal Behavior and Self-
Presentation, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 203 (1992) (reviewing self-awareness of self-presentational styles).
144. r = .57,p = .0001, n = 52.
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substantially as to the impact of the evidence. 4 It is not clear, however,
whether judges' expectations influence the.perceived strength of the evidence
or vice versa. Judges' expectations formed during trials about ultimate trial
outcomes are likely influenced by many factors. The multivariate analyses
address this issue.
Also, when judges expect guilty verdicts, the evidence is rated as less
complex.'" Conversely, when judges expect not-guilty verdicts, the evi-
dence is rated as more complex. The self-selecting nature of the cases that go
to trial, versus those that are plea bargained or settled, could partially account
for this result. That is, the cases that are tried are, in fact, ones in which the
defendant is more likely to be guilty (i.e., the case is rated as less complex).
Judges, knowing this, may expect trials to be less complex when the evidence
is strong toward guilt. This suggestion is consistent with the Stanford findings
where judges tended to expect guilty verdicts when defendants had relatively
more severe criminal histories. 47 It is also consistent with Kalven and
Zeisel's observation in The American Jury that judges are sometimes unable
to avoid being influenced by defendant background variables.' 48
9. Expectancy-Outcome Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' expectations for trial outcomes
relate to actual trial outcomes.149 Not surprisingly, the findings show that
judges' expectations for guilt predict actual trial outcomes of guilt.' The
primary issue explored in the Stanford Study was the extent to which judges'
expectations are conveyed to jurors in impermissible ways. The findings for
the Iowa Study of bench trials imply that judges' expectations formed during
145. Cf Empirical Research, supra note I, at 798-802 (discussing judge/jury agreement/disagreement
findings and relation to The American Jury results).
146. r = .44, p = .0011, n = 52.
147. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 120. These results also could be affected by the
types of cases that were studied (e.g., misdemeanors versus felonies).
148. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 124-27. "In addition to [the judge's] wide experience
with the likelihood that the defendant before him is guilty, the judge is exposed to prejudicial
information which the law, in its regard for the right of the defendant, aims to screen out of the
evaluation of his guilt or innocence. The law's ideal in these situations may be something of a
libertarian luxury." Id. at 127.
149. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 132-33 (noting that the simple correlation for this
relationship is r = -.20, which is not significant at p < .I0, but suggests a trend that expectations may
be related to outcomes in predictable ways).
150. r = -A6, p = .0006, n = 52. Part V addresses when judges' expectations, which, in fact,
impermissibly affect the course and outcome of trials, might constitute reversible error. See infra notes
245-62 and accompanying text (discussing trial and structural errors).
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trials may be conveyed not only to independent courtroom observers, but to
other trial participants as well, such as counsel and witnesses.
10. Expectancy-Sentence Relationships
Importantly, the magnitude of the sentence imposed by these judges does
not reflect their expectations, formed during trial, about the defendants'
guilt."' This finding suggests that any measurable preconceived notions
developed by these judges during bench trials about the defendants' guilt did
not relate to their subsequent sentencing patterns.1
52
11. Expectancy-Competence/Influence Relationships
This explores the relation between judges' expectations for trial outcomes
and the perceived competence and influence of the judge and counsel. When
judges expect a guilty verdict, they are rated as less influential.' Also,
when judges expect a guilty verdict, prosecution counsel are rated as more
competent. 54 More study is required to understand the complex relationship
between competence of counsel and judges' expectations for trial out-
comes. 155
12. Behavior-Evidentiary Relationships
This shows the relation among the micro and global behaviors and the
strength of the evidence. When the evidence is rated as strong toward guilt,
judges show less eye contact and fewer smiles 56 yet are rated as more
judicial, directive, and warm toward trial participants.'57 The findings
151. r= -. 16,p =.32, n =40.
152. Further research is needed, however, as almost two-thirds of the defendants in these trials did
not receive scheduled penalties.
153. r = .36, p = .009, n = 52. For judge competence, r = -.14, p = .33, n = 52 (nonsignificant
result). This finding is consistent with the view that when the evidence is strong toward guilt the trial
is less complex.
154. r = -.37, p = .007, n = 52. Also, when judges expected guilty verdicts, defense counsel were
rated as less influential (r = .55, p = .16, n = 8).
155. One methodological shortcoming of the analysis here is that the observers' perceptions of the
trial participants' competence and influence may be affected by their knowledge of the actual verdict,
since these ratings are made at the close of the trial.
156. For eye contact, r = .31, p = .03, n = 52; for smiles, r = .22, p = .12, n = 52. Also, when the
evidence is rated as more complex, judges show more postural changes: r =.24, p = .09, n = 52.
157. For judicial, r = -.20, p = .16, n = 52 (suggesting a trend); for directive, r = -.23, p =.11, n
52; for warm, r = -.31, p = .02, n = 52.
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suggest that strong evidence of guilt may relate to displays of positive (e.g.,
fair) global styles by judges at trial. 5 '
13. Behavior-Outcome Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' behavior predicts their verdicts in
bench trials.5 9 Consistent with the trends in the Stanford Study, when the
verdict is guilty, judges show less eye contact and fewer smiles and postural
changes (i.e., they are more negative), yet are globally warmer in relating to
trial participants (i.e., they are attempting to appear neutral).' These
findings, which are explored further in the multivariate analyses, indicate
identifiable relationships between judges' behavior during bench trials and
their subsequent guilty verdicts.' 6 '
14. Behavior-Sentence Relationships
This relationship describes how judges' behavior relates to the magnitude
of the sentence. 62 The findings show that when the magnitude of the
sentence is greater, judges show a trend for fewer postural changes, but are
rated as warmer (again, reflecting attempts to appear neutral). 3
15. Behavior-Competence/Influence Relationships
This shows the relation among the micro and global behaviors and the
perceived competence and influence of the trial participants. The findings may
be summarized as follows: First, when judges are perceived as more
competent (e.g., engaged), they display more head nods, hand movements,
158. It will be important to reexamine this relationship injury trials, where the judge may reflect to
jurors (through nonverbal channels alone) his or her views about the evidence presented at trial. In turn,
this dynamic may impact counsels' trial strategies or the jury's decision-making process.
159. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note I, at 133-34 (documenting study results showing
correlation between judges' behavior and jury verdicts).
160. r = -.26, p = .06, n = 52 (for eye contact); r = -.31, p = .03, n = 52 (for smiles); r = -.21,p=
.13, n = 52 (for postural changes); r = .30, p = .03, n = 52 (for warm).
161. Empirical Research, supra note 1, at 796 (noting that the simple correlation for the relationship
between judges' engaged micro behavior (e.g., between more eye contact and trial outcome) is r = .28,
p_< .10).
162. Cf The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 133-34 (documenting study results showing
correlation between judges' behavior and jury verdicts).
163. r = -.23, p = .16, n = 40 (for postural changes); r = .33, p = .04, n = 40 (for warm). Judges'
global and micro behaviors at trial, reflecting relatively less warm or more directive and engaged
attitudes, were hypothesized to relate to the imposition of more severe sentences. The simple results do
not support this prediction.
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postural changes, and self-touching and are rated as more judicial, directive,
warm, and confident.' 6 When judges are perceived as more influential, they
display more smiles, forward leans, and postural changes and are rated as
more judicial and confident. 61 Second, when prosecution counsel are
perceived as more competent and influential, judges display more head nods,
hand movements, and self-touching and are rated as more judicial, directive,
warm, and confident. 66 Third, when defense counsel are perceived as more
competent, judges display more hand movements and are rated as more
judicial, directive, and confident. 67 Defense counsel who are perceived as
more influential also receive more smiles from the judge.' 68 Taken together,
these findings imply that the intensity of courtroom interactions among trial
participants may, in part, be mediated by perceptions of the participants'
competence and influence. Thus, judges' perceptions of the competence of
counsel may be reflected in their behavior during the trial (for example, in
their reactions to counsels' objections or to witness testimony). 69
16. Outcome-Competence/Influence Relationships
This is the relation of trial outcomes to the competence and influence
ratings of the trial participants. The findings show that when the verdict is
guilty, judges are rated as less influential, prosecution counsel are rated as
164. r = .43,p = .0015, n = 52 (for nods); r = .35,p = .012, n = 52 (for hand movements); r = .23,
p = .10, n = 52 (for postural changes); r = .30,p = .04, n = 52 (for self-touching); r = .75,p = .0001,
n = 52 (for judicial); r = .24, p = .08, n = 52 (for directive); r = .60, p = .0001, n = 52 (for warm); r =
.75, p = .0001, n = 52 (for confident).
165. r = .40, p = .0035, n = 52 (for smiles); r = .24, p = .09, n = 52 (for forward leans); r = .42, p
.002, n = 52 (for postural changes); r = .30, p = .04, n = 52 (for judicial); r = .34, p = .02, n = 52
(for confident).
166. For competent: r = .28, p = .05, n = 52 (for nods); r = .20, p = .16, n = 52 (for hand
movements); r = .25, p = .07, n = 52 (for self-touching); r = .56, p = .000 1, n = 52 (for judicial); r =
.42, p = .002, n = 52 (for directive); r = .51, p = .0001, n = 52 (for warm); r = .47, p = .0004, n = 52
(for confident).
For influential: r = .37,p = .0075, n = 52 (for nods); r = .31,p = .03, n = 52 (for hand movements);
r = .39, p = .005, n = 52 (for self-touching); r = .53,p = .0001, n = 52 (for judicial); r =.24,p = .10,
n = 52 (for directive); r= .46,p = .0007, n = 52 (for warm); r = .57,p = .0001, n = 52 (for confident).
167. r = .60, p = .12, n = 8 (for hand movements); r = .84, p = .009, n = 8 (for judicial); r = .84,
p = .009, n = 8 (for directive); r = .89, p = .003, n = 8 (for confident).
168. r = .86, p = .007, n = 8 (for smiles), and same trend for eye contact (r = .57, p = .14, n = 8).
169. The potential impact on trial outcome of the dynamics of appearance of justice in jury as
compared to bench trials presents an interesting question for future study. See, e.g., Empirical Research,
supra note 1, at 800-01; see infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (discussing error). Note that the
outcome-sentence ("D-F") relationships are not tested in this Article (all guilty verdicts resulted in
some sentence). Further analysis is needed to describe how guilty verdicts in these bench trials relate
to the particular sentence imposed by the judge. As suggested above, this simple relationship is likely
affected by other variables in the model (e.g., defendant's criminal history) in meaningful ways.
Interestingly, analysis of this simple relationship also may reflect judges' sentencing patterns or their
adherence to legislatively mandated sentencing guidelines.
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more competent, and defense counsel are rated as less influential. 70 This
pattern of results suggests, predictably, that successful counsel are perceived
as more competent.' 7'
17. Sentence-Competence/Influence Relationships
This shows the relation between the magnitude of the sentence and ratings
of the trial participants. Consistent with prior findings, when the magnitude
of the sentence is greater, judges tend to be rated as less influential.'72 The
strength of the relationship is likely influenced by other factors in the model.
For example, when the magnitude of the sentence is greater, judges may be
perceived as less influential, particularly in cases in which the evidence is
strong toward guilt.
7 3
B. Cumulative Relationships in the Model
Multiple regression analyses are used next to explore combinations of
variables in the model. 74 The regression analyses employ several of the
variables as predictors of either trial outcome or magnitude of sentence
imposed.' 5 The analyses identify the independent and additive effects of the
strength of the evidence and extralegal forces on trial outcome and sentencing.
170. For judges, r = -.22, p = .12, n = 52 (influence); r = .16, p = .27, n = 52 (competence). For
prosecution counsel, r = .37, p = .007, n = 52 (competence). For defense counsel, r = -.87, p = .005,
n = 8 (influence).
171. As suggested earlier, it is also possible that when the evidence is stronger toward guilt and the
result is a guilty verdict, judges are perceived as less influential in the trial process. The cumulative and
partial correlation tests in Section B below shed further light on this issue. For example, note the partial
correlation finding that when controlling for strength of evidence, judges are rated as more competent
when the verdict is guilty. See infra text accompanying note 198.
172. r = -.22, p = .17, n = 40 (suggesting a weak trend for influence). No other results emerged for
this relationship.
173. This "C'-D-G predicting F" chain will be explored in future tests of the model. Cf. infra notes
186-93 and accompanying text (discussing regression tests of model).
174. The regression analyses enable a detailed assessment of the relationship between a set of
variables and one other variable. For a review of multiple regression techniques, see COHEN & COHEN,
supra note 100, at 7 (explaining that multiple regression analyses describe relationships between a
complex set of predictor variables and a single criterion variable).
175. For the test of the model in the Stanford Study of the extent to which trial outcomes are
predicted by the set of variables, including: the defendants' criminal histories, judges' expectations for
trial outcome, the engaged micro behaviors of the judge at trial, and the magnitude of judge-jury
agreement, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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1. Preliminary Tests
The regression analyses use several combinations of the background,
expectancy, communicative, evidentiary, and competence measures as
independent predictor variables. The two dependent measures are trial
outcome and magnitude of the sentence. 76
Of course, many combinations of the measures in the model may be
employed as variables in the regression equations.' 77 A positive relationship
between any independent variable and the dependent variable indicates a
higher rating on that measure when the verdict was guilty or when the
magnitude of the sentence was greater. A negative relationship indicates the
converse.
a. Example 1. "A-B-C-C'-G" Predicting "D"
This model uses trial outcome as the dependent measure and the following
as independent predictors: (1) defendants' gender, (2) ratings of the judges'
expectations for trial outcome, (3) ratings of the judges' seven micro
behaviors, (4) ratings of the strength of the evidence, and (5) ratings of
judges' and prosecution counsels' competence. 78 The R2 for this regression
equation is statistically significant: R2 = .575, F(12, 39) = 4.40, p < .0002.
The individual results of this test of the model are shown in Table 1. 7 1
176. For an explanation of the analyses and statistical testing, see supra note 74. See also COHEN
& COHEN, supra note 100, at 49-50, 104. All tests of statistical significance are "two-tailed." The term
"ns" refers to the result being statistically not significant at the p < .10 level.
177. At some point, the inclusion of too many independent variables in the regression model inhibits
meaningful interpretation of the results. Therefore, selected regression models of theoretical interest are
presented.
178. The sample size for ratings of defense counsel was not large enough to justify inclusion of this
measure in the regression analyses. See supra note 112.
179. The regression coefficients in Tables 1-4 are used to form a linear combination of independent
variables to estimate the dependent variable (e.g., verdict or magnitude of sentence). The explained
variance for each independent variable represents the contribution of each variable in the model,
controlling for the effects of all other variables. See COHEN & COHEN, supra note 100, at 39-40. For
the individual variables in the model, a conservative estimate of explained variance is computed by
dividing the sum of squares (Type II in SAS computer program) by the corrected total sum of squares.
Type II sum of squares reflects the variance accounted for assuming that variable is entered last in the
regression equation. The combined individual explained variance will be less than the total explained
variance.
Logistic regression is also an appropriate means of assessing relationships between combinations of
independent measures with a dichotomous dependent measure, such as verdict. However, the sample size



























































Total Explained Variance = 58%
t 'Coded as 1 = men, 2 = women.
: Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
* Coded by counting, from less to more.
A Coded from I to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
tt Statistical significance assessed at p = < .10.
tt Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not competent, 9 = very competent.
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Table 1 shows that several variables in the model together and independent-
ly predict trial outcomes. Guilty verdicts are predicted when: (1) judges
display fewer smiles throughout the trial, (2) the strength of the evidence is
rated as strong toward guilt, (3) the judge is rated as less competent, and (4)
the prosecution is rated as more competent.8 0
Neither defendant gender nor judges' expectations for trial outcomes
independently add to the prediction of trial outcomes. In this test of the
model, the strongest independent predictor of trial outcomes is strength of the
evidence (explaining 16% of the variance).' The combined explained
variance of the micro behaviors is approximately 6%, suggesting that these
variables add independently (albeit modestly) to the prediction of trial
outcomes.1
82
b. Example 2: "A-B-C-C'-G" Predicting "D"
The next test of the model uses the same independent predictors from
Example 1 above but substitutes the global "C" variables for the micro
variables. 8 3 The dependent measure remains trial outcome. The R2 for the
regression equation is statistically significant: R2 = .601, F(9, 42) = 7.03, p <
.0001. The individual results of this test are shown in Table 2.
in Tables I and 2. Hence, only results from least-squares regression are presented. However, a stepwise
logistic regression was used to select the most substantial variables. When selecting from the variables
in Table 1, the following were considered: strength of evidence (b = 5.25, Chi Square = 3.39,p = .07),
prosecution competence (b = 4.56, Chi Square = 3.7 1,p = .06), and self-touching (b = -3.93, Chi Square
= 3.16,p = .08 ). A Chi Square test based on the log-likelihood function was significant for the model
(Chi Square = 43.68, df= 3, p = .0001). When selecting from the variables in Table 2, the following
were considered: strength of evidence (b = 5.14, Chi Square = 2 .4 4 , p = .12), prosecution competence
(b = 7.61, Chi Square = 1.91,p = .17 ), andjudicial global style (b = -5.70, Chi Square = 1.83,p = .18).
A Chi Square test based on the log-likelihood function was significant for this model (Chi Square =
45.46, df= 3, p = .0001). These exploratory analyses indicate that future studies should include the
above-mentioned and other variables as increased sample size allows.
180. Analogous ratings are not available for defense counsel as m most cases defendants represented
themselves. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
181. The R' for strength of the evidence variable only is .462, showing that addition of defendant
gender, expectancy, micro behaviors, and competence result in an increase of .i 14 (differences not
significant, F = .95, p = .51, df= 1I, 39).
182. When the regression is conducted, substituting defendant age for gender, the R2 = .585, F(12,
39) = 4.59, p < .0001. The significant independent predictor variables are: (I) strength of the evidence,
I = 3.68, p = .0007; and (2) prosecution competence, I = 2.03, p = .05.
183. Again, for these exploratory tests, the goal is to limit the number of variables tested in the
model to aid in its preliminary interpretation.
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TABLE 2











































Total Explained Variance = 60%
t Coded as 1 = men, 2 = women.
: Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
* Coded by counting, from less to more.
& Statistical significance assessed at p _ .10.
it Coded from I to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
t1 Statistical significance assessed at p < .10.
** Coded from I to 9; 1 = not competent, 9 = very competent.
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Table 2 shows that several variables in the model together and independent-
ly predict trial outcomes. Guilty verdicts result when: (1) judges are warmer
throughout trials (i.e., reflect a supportive appearance), (2) the strength of the
evidence is rated as strong toward guilt, and (3) the prosecution is rated as
more competent.
Neither defendants' gender nor judges' expectations for trial outcomes add
to the prediction of trial outcomes. The strongest independent predictor of
trial outcome is again the strength of the evidence (explained variance =
20.6%).1 4 An independent effect of judges' warmth on trial outcomes also
appears (explained variance = 2.7%).' The global styles contribute
modestly to the prediction of outcome (separately, explained variance = 4.4%;
together, explained variance = 8%).
c. Example 3: "A-B-C-C'-G" Predicting "F"
This test employs the magnitude of the sentence as the dependent mea-
sure."8 6 The independent predictors are: (1) defendants' gender, (2) ratings
of the judges' expectations for trial outcome, (3) ratings of the judges' seven
micro communicative behaviors, (4) ratings of the strength of the evidence,
and (5) ratings of judges' and prosecution counsels' competence. Consistent
with the pattern of simple relationships, the R2 for the regression equation is
not statistically significant: R2 = .304, F(12, 27) = .981, p = .49. This
nonfinding suggests that, when considering all the variables in this model
together, these judges are not influenced substantially by these factors in their
sentencing decisions.' 8
7
The individual results of this test of the model are shown in Table 3.
184. The R2 for strength of the evidence variable only is A62, showing that the addition of defendant
gender, expectancy, global behaviors, and competence result in an increase of .139 (difference is
significant, F = 1.83, p = .10, df(8, 42).
185. When the regression is conducted substituting defendant age for gender, the R2 = .607, F = 7.20,
p < .0001, df(9, 42). The significant independent predictor variables are: strength of the evidence, t =
4A5, p = .0001; and prosecution competence, t = 2A8, p = .02.
186. The sample size for this test of the model is 39 cases (i.e., only those cases in which a guilty
verdict was found).
187. This is not to suggest that the same 30% of the variance explained by the model is, in practical
terms, insignificant. See Robert Rosenthal & Peter D. Blanck, Science and Ethics in Conducting,
Analyzing, and Reporting Social Science Research: Implications for Social Scientists, Judges, and



























































Total Explained Variance = 30%
1 Coded as 1 = men, 2 = women.
t Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
* Coded by counting, from less to more.
a Coded from I to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
t" Coded from I to 9; I = not competent, 9 = very competent.
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Table 3 shows that the variables in this regression, when controlling for the
effects of the other variables, do not predict judges' sentencing patterns. The
following measures alone tend to relate to the imposition of relatively more
severe sentences: (1) cases involving defendants who are men, and (2) cases
in which the judge is rated as more competent.'
These findings echo those for the simple relationships, suggesting that some
individual variables may alone, but not in combination, predict sentencing
patterns of these judges.'89 Strikingly, strength of the evidence explains only
1.1% of the variance in predicting sentences. 9 ' This finding contrasts
dramatically with the substantial effect of strength of the evidence in
predicting trial outcomes. Likewise, the individual combination of the micro
behaviors explains roughly 19% of the variance in predicting sentences. This
finding is also dramatic when compared to the combined impact of the micro
behaviors when predicting trial outcomes (e.g., explaining 6%).
d. Example 4: "A-B-C-C'-G" Predicting "F"
The final test substitutes the global variables for the micro variables but
retains as the dependent measure the magnitude of the sentence.' 9' The R2
for this regression equation is: R2 = .327, F(9, 30) = 1.62, p = .16. The
individual results of this test are shown in Table 4.
188. Analogous ratings are not available for defense counsel. See supra note 112 and accompanying
text.
189. When the regression is conducted, substituting defendant age for gender, R2 = .232, F(12, 27)
0 .681, p = .76. The only independent predictor variable is nods: t = 1.65,p =.12 (suggesting a trend
only).
190. The R2 for strength of evidence variable only is .0001, showing that the addition of defendant
gender, expectancy, micro behaviors, and competence result in an increase of .304 (difference is not
significant, F = 1.07, p = .42, df(11, 27)).
















































Total Explained Variance = 33%
t Coded as I = men, 2 = women.
t Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
* Coded by counting, from less to more.
A Coded from 1 to 9; 1 = not guilty, 9 = guilty.
tt Coded from I to 9; 1 = not competent, 9 = very competent.
1162 [Vol. 68:1119
CALIBRATING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
Table 4 indicates that the variables in this regression, when controlling for
the effects of the other variables, do not well predict judges' sentencing. 192
In this test of the model, the strength of the evidence alone explains less than
1% of the variance in predicting sentences (as compared to between 16% and
21% for predicting trial outcomes). In contrast, the global styles explain 14%
of the variance in predicting sentences (as compared to 4% for predicting trial
outcomes).' 93
The findings of the four sample regression equations illustrate the extent to
which several combinations of measures are useful for predicting trial
outcomes and sentence magnitudes. 194 Despite the strong independent effect
of the strength of the evidence, extralegal factors, such as judges' communica-
tive variables, emerge as modest independent predictors of trial outcomes. The
same combinations of variables do not strongly predict sentencing patterns.
Taken together, the findings of the regression analyses suggest three
preliminary conclusions: (1) strength of the evidence is a strong predictor of
trial outcomes but not of sentencing patterns; (2) judges' communicative
behavior during trial is a relatively better predictor of sentencing patterns than
of trial outcomes; and (3) in bench trials, judges appear able to separate
factors affecting their fact finding role (i.e., the determination of guilt) from
those affecting their sentencing function. 95
Further research with actual trials is warranted to understand the relative
impact of legal and extralegal factors on judge decision making.' 96 The next
section uses partial correlational analyses to explore in greater detail the
192. When the regression is conducted, substituting defendant age for gender, R2 = .325, F(9, 30) =
1.61, p = .16. Interestingly, several independent predictor variables emerge: (1) judges' expectancy for
guilty, t = 1.86, p = .08; (2) warm style, t = 1.72, p = .10; and (3) prosecution competence, t = -1.73,
p = .10. Further examination of this combination of variables may be warranted.
193. The R 2 for strength of evidence variable only is .0001, showing that the addition of defendant
gender, expectancy, global behaviors, and competence result in an increase of .327 (indicating that
difference is marginally substantial, F = 1.82,p = .12, df(8, 30)).
194. That sentencing decisions were not substantially predicted by the variables in the model is an
important result. As discussed in the final Part of this Article, the study of the factors that influence the
sentencing process is a complicated task that calls for further research in its own right. See infra notes
274-88 and accompanying text.
195. Cf Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV.
523, 573 (1993) (regarding need for theory to segregate conviction issues from sentencing issues).
196. In subsequent tests of the model, the independent effect of the "A" variable ("seriousness of the
offense") will be explored. Seriousness of the offense is coded in the Iowa Study by the maximum
possible sentence for a particular charge. Preliminary bivariate analyses show that seriousness of the
offense relates to: (1) more leans (r = .30,p = .06, n = 40) and postural changes (r = .36,p = .02, n =
40) by the judge during the trial, but (2) less warm behavior by the judge during the trial (r = -.42, p
= .006, n = 40). Future analyses will explore the seriousness of the offense as an independent predictor
of trial outcome and magnitude of the sentence.
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independent effect of the strength of the evidence on trial outcomes and
sentencing.
2. Partial Correlations Controlling for Strength of Evidence
Partial correlations describe the relationship between any independent
variable and a dependent variable, statistically controlling for the effects of
other variables in the model.'97 Partial correlation analyses here explore the
extent to which predictions of trial outcome and sentence magnitude are based
primarily on an independent relationship with the strength of the evidence
variable.
Table 5 presents the partial correlations between trial outcomes and
defendants' backgrounds, judges' expectations, judges' communicative
variables, and competence measures, controlling for the strength of the
evidence.'98
Examination of the partial correlations between verdict and other variables
in the model reveals several findings. Foremost, controlling for the strength
of the evidence, two of the judges' communicative variables alone tend to
predict guilty verdicts: (1) fewer smiles and (2) less judicial behavior. Second,
taking into account the strength of the evidence, there is a trend for older
defendants to receive more guilty verdicts than younger defendants. Third,
when controlling for the strength of the evidence, prosecution counsel are
rated as more competent when the verdict is guilty. The results of the partial
correlations highlight the suggestion that, although the strength of the
evidence may be a central factor in judge or jury decision making, other
extralegal factors independently influence this process in significant ways.
This extralegal influence may be particularly apparent in cases in which the
evidence is close.199 This conclusion is consistent with the Stanford re-
sults.2"'
197. See COHEN & COHEN, supra note 100, at 83, 181-82 (explaining that partial correlation is the
relationship between two variables with other independent variables held constant).
198. The dffor this statisitcal test is 49. Analogous tests are performed controlling for the complexity
of the evidence but are not reported here.
199. Close cases are artificially defined here by using partial correlation analyses to control for the
strength of the evidence.
200. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 5
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS WITH VERDICT ("D"):




Defendant Age .181 .11
Defendant Gender .005 .49
"B" Expectancy .128 .19
"C" Communicative:
Eye Contact -.074 .30
Smiles -.231 .06t
Head Nods .004 .49
Forward Leans -.054 .36
Hand Movements .077 .30
Postural Changes -. 135 .17
Self-Touching -.066 .33
Judicial -. 199 .09t
Warm .126 .19
Directive -. 124 .20





t Partial correlation for defendant socioeconomic status is -.014, p = .46.




Table 6 presents the partial correlations between magnitude of sentence,
defendants' backgrounds, judges' expectations, judges' communicative
variables, and competence measures, controlling for the strength of the
evidence.20 '
Examination of the partial correlations between the magnitude of the
sentence with the other independent measures in the model, controlling for the
strength of the evidence, reveals that two communicative variables indepen-
dently tend to predict the magnitude of the sentence: (1) fewer postural
changes, yet (2) warmer behavior (e.g., reflecting a post-verdict attempt to
appear just toward the defendant).
The preliminary findings of the Iowa Study suggest several directions for
future inquiry. The results are encouraging, given that observers were able to
assess reliably many trial factors that were then shown to relate to judges'
behavior, decision making, and sentencing. The final Part of this Article
explores the implications of the findings, with emphasis on the need for future
empirical study of the appearance of justice, trial error, and sentencing
patterns.
201. The df for this statistical test is 37.
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TABLE 6
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS WITH MAGNITUDE OF SENTENCE ("F"):




Defendant Age -.061 .36
Defendant Gender -. 195 .12
"B" Expectancy .172 .15
"C" Communicative:
Eye Contact -.022 .45
Smiles -. 137 .21
Head Nods .197 .12
Forward Leans -.096 .28
Hand Movements -.074 .33














V. EMERGING ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF TRIAL PROCESSES
This Article has set forth a model for exploring empirically the impact of
legal and extralegal factors on trial outcomes and sentencing. There is much
to be learned about how these factors together and independently influence
trial decision making.20 2 The developing empirical research cannot yet
inform researchers, courts, and practitioners about many of the issues
concerning the complexity of judges' behavior and decision making. 2 3 This
is true because of the constraints of sampling, the inability of researchers to
assign defendants randomly to bench or jury trials, and ethical considerations
involving research with actual trials.2 °4
Many judges at the trial and appellate levels remain unaware of the impact
of extralegal forces on trial outcomes or of the developing research on trial
processes.1 5 This final Pait raises several emerging issues in the develop-
ment of research on judges' behavior.
A. Toward a More Cumulative View of Social Science Research
Researchers, courts, and legal practitioners often raise questions about the
generalizability of actual courtroom behavior studies and the extent to which
the results of any particular study would hold true across the population of
judges or over different types of trials.20 6 The primary means for addressing
these questions lie in the replication and refinement of the results of any study
202. Communicating with Juries, Panel Two: Innovations for Improving Courtroom Communication
and Views from Appellate Courts, The Annenberg Washington Program Conference, April 10, 1992, 68
IND. L.J. 1061, 1067 (1993) [hereinafter Panel Two] (statement of Judge Patricia Wald) (commenting
that there is little known about the impact of trial processes on trial outcomes).
203. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO, AM. BAR ASS'N & BROOKINGS INST., IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF JURY DECISION MAKING: ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY, SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
204. For a review, see INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS, supra note 41, at 339-43 (exploring the
"process" of research in the courtroom). See also Rosenthal & Blanck, supra note 187; Hagan &
Bumiller, supra note 6, at 10-18 (noting other methodological issues).
205. Panel Two, supra note 202, at 1067 (statement of Judge Patricia Wald). Other appellate judges
are skeptical generally of the value of juries as fact finders. Id. at 1067 (statement of Justice James D.
Heiple) ("I am very skeptical of the value of juries and probably, if it were up to me, would abolishjuries in civil cases.').
206. Additional study is needed of pro se trials versus cases in which the defendant is represented
by counsel. This study is especially warranted in light of the case law that pro se defendants be accorded
their constitutional right to a fair trial. See Oses v. Massachusetts, 775 F. Supp. 443,456, 465 (D. Mass.
1991) (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases on the rights of the pro se defendant, and noting that the trialjudge "polluted the atmosphere [of the trial] with his own actions and his inability properly to control
the actions of the other trial participants").
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for legal scholars, practitioners, and courts to develop a more cumulative view
of social science research.
This Article has presented information derived from an ongoing effort to
describe the impact of various factors on trial processes and outcomes in
bench trials. The research uses a theoretical model for exploring these issues.
By building on the Stanford Study, the extended test of the model in Iowa
bench trials identified patterns of findings that not only have implications for
this set of trials conducted by these judges, but for courtroom processes
conducted by other judges in other types of cases as well.
In the Stanford Study, the magnitude of the findings for the potential impact
of trial judges' nonverbal behavior alone was about 9% of the variance, or in
correlational terms, on average a correlation of approximately 0.3.207 This
is a substantial effect by many research standards, but it leaves a good amount
of variation in the results unexplained.2 °8 Still, this effect may be especially
noteworthy to counsel of the 9% of defendants found guilty or not guilty as
a result of the judges' communicative behavior." 9
In the Iowa Study, preliminary regression analyses show the predictive
power of the model. When taking into account various combinations of
variables to predict trial outcomes, the model predicts 58% to 60% of the
explained variance, or in correlational terms, an average correlation of
approximately 0.76.210 This substantial finding illustrates the practical
importance of the model, while at the same time acknowledging that bench
trials are complex interactions that involve many other factors.2 '
The Iowa Study also shows that extralegal forces independently influence
trial outcomes in significant ways.2t2 For instance, the micro behaviors
alone account for approximately 6% and the global styles alone for approxi-
mately 4% of the explained variance. These results support the general
magnitude of the effect found in the Stanford Study.
207. Panel One, supra note 3, at 1056 (statement of Robert Rosenthal).
208. See Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 775-76 (providing other examples of studies showing small
effect sizes, yet having dramatic practical importance).
209. See Panel One, supra note 3, at 1056 (statement of Robert Rosenthal) (regarding effect of
Stanford Study).
210. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (reporting results of regression equation for Example
1, and predicting trial outcome).
211. Lawrence P. Tiffany et al., A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts: Defendants
Convicted After Trial, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975) (noting that in federal courts, conviction by jury
generally leads to a more severe sentence than conviction in bench trials).
212. Galen V. Bodenhausen, Second Guessing the Jury: Stereotypes and Hindsight Biases in
Perceptions of Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1112, 1118 (1990) (reporting results of




Additionally, in the Iowa Study, the strength of the evidence independently
accounts for some 16% to 21% of the explained variance in predicting trial
outcomes. Likewise, the competence ratings of the judge and prosecution
counsel add to the predictive power of the model, together contributing
approximately 7% to 8% of the explained variance in predicting trial
outcomes.
Examination of partial correlations further supports the substantial relation
between trial outcomes and extralegal variables. These findings illustrate that,
when controlling for the strength of the evidence, extralegal forces indepen-
dently predict trial outcomes and sentencing. Thus, this influence may be
particularly apparent in close cases. Had the Iowa Study not been performed,
little information would exist about the relative impact in bench trials of
evidentiary and extralegal factors on trial outcomes and sentencing.2"3
The Iowa Study also shows that combinations of variables in the model do
not significantly predict judges' sentencing patterns. Though not unsubstantial
in magnitude, in contrast to the results for trial outcomes, the total explained
variance for sentencing ranges from 30% to 33%. Most striking is the finding
that the strength of the evidence variable independently accounts for only 1%
of the variance in the prediction of sentence magnitude. This finding is
dramatic when compared to the substantial effect of this variable on trial
outcomes. In addition, the explained variance of the independent effect of the
micro behaviors and global styles ranges from 14% to 19% in predicting the
magnitude of sentences. Taking into account the evidence of the case,
however, sentencing decisions still are not related substantially to extralegal
variables in the model.214
Legal scholars and practitioners typically have exaggerated the impact of
extralegal variables on trial outcomes and underestimated the extent to which
judge or juror decision making is affected by the strength and quality of the
evidence."1 5 Quite to the contrary, the Iowa findings show that the strength
213. For a detailed empirical study of bench trials, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1067, 1107 (1984) (concluding that formal bench trial permits
expeditious, fair, and accurate resolution of criminal cases, and noting differences in style and demeanor
of public defenders in bench trials).
214. Compare id. at 1070 (noting judges' active "judicial behavior" in bench trials) with supra notes
60-73 and accompanying text (describing judges' global directive styles).
215. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 755 (concluding that simulated trial studies that manipulate
evidentiary strength show that extralegal factors are most powerful when trial evidence is weak).
It will be interesting to examine also the extent to which different trial participants-judges, jurors,
lawyers--estimate the effect that legal and extralegal factors have on trial outcomes. Cf Lee E.
Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identily the Impact of
Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147, 1172 (reporting results that prosecutors and
defense attorneys view evidence differently). As suggested above, lawyers may tend to exaggerate the
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of the evidence is generally a better predictor of trial outcomes than are
extralegal factors. On the other hand, the "appearance of justice" is a
relatively better predictor of sentencing.
Without further replication, the Stanford Study and the Iowa Study must
continue to be interpreted with caution, despite the predicted pattern of
findings.2t 6 The findings do not imply necessarily that similar effects will
always be found in other trials and courts and with other judges.2 The
present program of research illustrates, however, a view of social science
research as a cumulative endeavor. 1 8 Courts, legal scholars, and practition-
ers need to become increasingly familiar with the emerging statistical
techniques for assessing this body of social science research.219 Future
research will refine the preliminary findings and further evaluate the
magnitude of the effects found here. 220 Research will also need to be
conducted with actual and mock trial participants to reveal the effects of legal
and extralegal forces on judges' decision making.22'
A cumulative view of social science study also enables courts and
practitioners to better evaluate the practical importance of the present body
of research.222 Less attention is focused on particular results and more on
probable effect that extralegal factors have on outcome and to ignore the fact that juror decision making
is affected primarily by the strength of the evidence. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 755
(summarizing studies of mock trials showing that extralegal factors have their greatest impact when the
evidence is strong and that the relative impact of extralegal factors is small compared to the impact of
evidentiary factors).
216. For a review, see Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 771-79 (arguing the benefits of
psychologist-lawyer collaboration).
217. Id. at 755, 771-79.
218. See Rosenthal, supra note 5 (providing overview of this trend); Ralph L. Rosnow & Robert
Rosenthal, Statistical Procedures and the Justification of Knowledge in Psychological Science, 44 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1276 (1989) (same).
219. See Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 845-47 (1992) (arguing
that the courts need to become familiar with aggregation techniques such as meta-analysis).
220. This view is furthered by the development of theoretical models, such as the one presented
herein, that aid in the precision of replication of research studies. See Robert Rosenthal, Cumulating
Psychology: An Appreciation of Donald T. Campbell, 2 PSYCHOL Sci. 213, 217,219 (1991) (noting the
importance of replication and a more cumulative view of social science research through meta-analytic
statistical techniques); see also Peter D. Blanck, Empirical Study of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 121
(1992) (noting the importance of not overgeneralizing from the results of a single social science study);
Peter D. Blanck, The Emerging Work Force: Empirical Study of the Americans With Disabilities Act,
1.6 J. CORP. L. 693 (1991) (same).
221. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 4, at 755 (noting the importance of understanding the relative
effect of legal and extralegal factors on trial outcomes).
222. Cf. Panel One, supra note 3, at 1057 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell) (noting that




the overall magnitude of the phenomenon in question. 23 Likewise, less
emphasis is placed on the results of a single study as determinative of a
particular legal fact.224 The importance of cumulation to the interpretation
of social science research requires further discussion than allotted here. 5
B. Using the Model to Assess Trial Error
Appellate courts evaluate the propriety of legal and extralegal factors in
judge and jury decision making.226 The model enables appellate courts to
review more systematically alleged error in criminal trials. It may also further
the understanding of the extent to which the alleged error is harmless or
prejudicial to the rights of the criminal defendant.2
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), harmless error is "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
... 22 In Chapman v. California,229 the Supreme Court held that a
lower court must find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
223. Rosnow & Rosenthal, supra note 218, at 1278-79 (noting the importance of defining the results
of social science research in effect-size terms).
224. Id. at 1280.
225. See generally Rosenthal & Blanck, supra note 187. For example, another area that may be
studied from a more cumulative view is the effect of the increasing use of video evidence in trials, an
effect dramatically demonstrated in the Rodney King trials. Technological advances will make videotape
evidence crucial to legal processes, whether in will documentation, consent issues, or testimonial
evidence. In criminal and civil cases, video evidence not only is usefil for examining witness demeanor
but also for establishing facts. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Juries and Justice, FoRBES, June 8, 1992, at 136.
Moreover, appellate review of videotape evidence will likely raise new issues about the nature and
evaluation of evidence.
The study of self-awareness and evidentiary presentation at trial will also be an important next
step of study. For a comprehensive review, see generally DePaulo, supra note 143. Questions such as
the following remain: What awareness do judges and trial participants have of their expression of
nonverbal behavior? How may lawyers "match" their sending communication skills with the receiving
skills of judges and juries? Many argue, though, that the judicial system is reluctant to open itself to
scrutiny of self-analysis, particularly as dockets become increasingly overcrowded. Panel One, supra
note 3, at 1057 (statement of Judge LaDoris Cordell) (noting that the-California judiciary has not
responded, at least through its judicial college, to study issues related to communication bias in the
courtroom).
226. For a review, see Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1176-80 (discussing problem raised in
analysis of harmless error).
227. The related issue may be stated as follows: "Should reversal of a trial decision in which error
has occurred depend upon a determination by the appellate court of the probable effect in fact of the
error, or should it turn on the probable accuracy of the verdict reached below?" Id. at 1177.
228. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(a). That rule also defines "plain error" as one "affecting substantial rights
[that] may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Id.
229. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" 230 before federal constitutional
error can be harmless. In essence, the Court found that there may be some
constitutional errors that do not require automatic reversal. 23'
The Court also recognized in Chapman that some "constitutional rights [are]
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harm-
less."' 2 One such right enunciated by the Court is the guarantee to a trial
before an impartial judge.233 The Court affirmed this position in Gray v.
Mississippi,234 concluding that the violation of some constitutional rights can
never be considered harmless error.235 In Gray, the Court declared that
"[tihe right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a
right." 6 More recently, in Arizona v. Fulminante,237 the Court concluded
that a biased judge is one example of "structural" error.238 In Fulminante,
Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished "trial" versus "structural" errors.2 39
Trial errors occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and...
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. '241 Structural error, in contrast, affects the "entire
conduct of the trial from beginning to end."24'
The model here allows for the calibration of the independent and combined
effects of trial and structural error on trial outcomes and sentencing. Such
analyses may illustrate "quantitatively" any real world weakness or strength
in the trial/structural error distinction drawn by the Court in Fulminante.
230. Id. at 24; cf. United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
If, in light of all the circumstances-the language of the instructions, the arguments of counsel,
and the evidence itself-it is "highly improbable" that the jury convicted on an improper
theory, then "technical errors in the instructions are deemed harmless, and we will affirm." If,
on the other hand, these factors indicate a "substantial possibility" that the jury convicted on
an improper legal theory, then reversal is required.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1339, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984).
231. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
232. Id. at 23.
233. Id. at 23 n.8; see id. at 52 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that a biased judge could
never be deemed a harmless error); see also supra notes 9-33 and accompanying text (discussing the
appearance of justice).
234. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
235. Id. at 668.
236. Id.
237. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
238. Id. at 1265. (Rehnquist, C.L, delivering the opinion in part and dissenting in part).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 1265.
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Additionally, the model is a method to calibrate the essential purpose of a
criminal trial; that is, "to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence, and [to] promote[] public respect for the criminal process by
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually
inevitable presence of immaterial error." '242 Thus, the model helps in the
calibration of the magnitude of error,243 and, in subsequent tests, may prove
useful for exploring the contention that without such a framework for
analysis, a structural error is one "we can never know with any certainty."2
Along these lines, Professor Ogletree writes:
If the essential distinction between "trial" and "structural" errors lies in
whether they are susceptible to being quantified and compared with other
evidence, then the Fulminante majority was wrong to conclude that all
errors that occur at trial are sometimes susceptible of measurement and that
all those that pervade the trial "from beginning to end" rarely are.24
Ogletree concludes: "Ultimately, the classification of error must rest on some
empirical assumptions about whether, in the real world, errors of this kind are
susceptible to harmless error analysis and how often they are clearly
harmless. 24 s Thus, the model may be used to test empirical assumptions in
the Court's trial/structural error distinction, as well as to further the discussion
of how the harmless error rule may be applied to the case of the biased trial
judge. 247
Another issue is the model's potential for calibrating the overall effect of
error on a decision maker (e.g., on a judge or jury). Recently, in Yates v.
Evatt,248 the Court held that to find an error "did not 'contribute' to the
ensuing verdict" is not to suggest that a jury may have been "totally unaware
of that feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous. 249 In Yates,
Justice Souter wrote: "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict
is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
242. Id. at 1264 (citations omitted).
243. But see id. (White, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "drawing a meaningless dichotomy
between 'trial errors' and 'structural defects' in the trial process"); see also Ogletree; supra note 21, at
161-72 (critiquing trial/structural error analysis).
244. Ogletree, supra note 21, at 162.
245. Id. at 163 (showing that even with the existence of a biased judge (structural error), there can
still be overwhelming evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt).
246. Id. at 164.
247. Id. at 165 (asserting that "if a judge's bias, however manifested, can be separated and substantial
evidence of guilt exists, harmless error may apply").
248. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991).
249. Id. at 1893.
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considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record."25 Whether
or not some 9% to 15% of the variance explained by judges' behavior in
predicting trial outcomes and sentences is "unimportant in relation to
everything else the jury consider[s]" remains an unanswered (but testable)
empirical question.25" '
Additionally, the model allows for review of evidentiary strength and
information that may not be conveyed by the written trial record alone.252
In the Stanford Study, this was accomplished by videotape analyses, and in
the Iowa Study, by on-line courtroom ratings. With either mode, the model
provides a means for reviewing courts to assess the impact of various legal
and extralegal forces on trial decision making "as a whole.9253
In decisions subsequent to Chapman, however, the Court has not required
a "formulaic indication" by state courts in their review of harmless error.254
In these cases, at minimum, the Court has required a statement from the lower
courts that the harmless error analysis survives federal scrutiny.255 Yet in
one instance, the Court remanded a case in which the lower court failed to
provide a detailed explanation on the record to support its conclusion of
harmless error.256
It is not surprising, therefore, that federal and state appellate courts have not
consistently interpreted the circumstances under which error requires reversal
of a verdict. 257 This may be the result of a lack of means for assessing the
250. Id. Justice Souter also assumes that jurors "generally follow the instructions they are given."
Id. This assumption may not be consistent with empirical research on jury decision making. See Arthur
S. Hayes, Jurors' Grasp of Instructions May Stir Appeal, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1992, at BI, B5 (citing
Zeisel study findings to the contrary).
25 1. For a critique of the application of the harmless error rule, see Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous
Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOwA L. REV.
311, 329-35 (1985) (critiquing application of harmless error rule).
252. To make a judgment of error, a court must make two inquiries: (1) What evidence did the jury
consider in reaching its verdict?; and (2) Was the probative force of the noncontested evidence
considered by the jury so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict based
on that evidence would have been the same in.the absence of the contested evidence? Yates, I I 1 S. Ct.
at 1893-94.
253. See Ogletree, supra note 21, at 159 (reviewing cases) (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499 (1983)) (stating that it is "the duty of the court to consider the trial record as a whole"); cf
appendix C (noting Iowa Study findings regarding the reliability and consistency of the on-line ratings).
254. Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114,2123 (1992); cf. id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("An
appellate court's bald assertion that an error of constitutional dimensions was 'harmless' cannot
substitute for a principled explanation of how the court reached that conclusion.").
255. Id. at 2123 (Souter, J., for the Court) ("[A] plain statement that the judgment survives ...
[harmless error analysis] is clearly preferable ....").
256. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753-55 (1990) (noting the lower court's "cryptic"
one-sentence conclusion to support finding of harmless error).
257. Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1176-77 & n.60. Discussion here is limited to federal court
cases; for a review of related state court decisions, see id. at 1178. For a general review of harmless
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impact of legal and extralegal factors on trial outcome. It may also be a result
of the reality that the assessment of error, whether defined as trial or
structural error, is a difficult task for appellate courts. Before error can be
held to be harmless, a court must be able to find that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. 5 8
Subsequent tests of the model will explore methods for reviewing courts to
more systematically perform error analysis.2 5 9 Future tests will also examine
the ways prosecution and defense counsel may document at trial the nature of
the alleged prejudicial behavior or evidence to allow appellate courts to
determine from the record whether the error, in whole or in substantial part,
contributed to the conviction. 60 In light of the dearth of empirical informa-
tion on actual trial error,26 the preliminary findings from the Iowa Study
are encouraging. The findings imply that an appellate court, like the
independent on-line review performed by the Iowa observers (or by an
"4average" juror262), may make reliable evaluations of the relatioh among
legal and extralegal forces, trial outcome, and error. 63
Finally, the model enables systematic study of the relation between alleged
error by biased trial judges and principles of disqualification law.2"
Appellate courts remain reluctant to question the discretion and behavior of
error approaches, see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 79 (1988).
258. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24(1967) (reviewing when constitutional error requires
a reversal); Arizona v. Fulminante, 11 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (holding that the erroneous admission
of a coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis on appeal); see also Ogletree, supra note
21, at 161-72 (reviewing harmless error rule); Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1179 & n.67
(providing examples of constitutional and nonconstitutional errors).
259. Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1177-78 (suggesting that the concept of a "substantial
right" is ambiguous and might mean a right to a correct verdict on the evidence as a whole or to a jury
verdict that was not influenced by error). For a general test of harmless error in criminal cases, see
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
260. The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 145 (discussing ways that counsel may document
record for appellate review of judges' behavior); see also Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1192
(noting that study is needed of the notion that the right of the accused is not to a perfect trial nor to an
irrational verdict, but "to a trial in which improper evidence or argument would not have moved a
reasonable jury to convict when otherwise they would have been in doubt").
261. Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1182, 1189 (reporting study using simulated trial scenarios
and noting lack of empirical data).
262. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (judging evidence based on probable
impact on minds of the "average jury").
263. Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1182, 1190-91 (concluding that appellate courts may not
always make judgments consistent with juries and, in some circumstances (such as review of a directed
verdict), appellate courts must employ their own judgments as to the strength of the evidence against
defendants).
264. See Figure 1, supra text accompanying note 40; supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text
(discussing relationship between appearance of justice and judicial disqualification or recusal).
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trial judges.265 Rarely is the behavior of the trial judge alone the subject of
review on appeal. Again, this is true in part because there has not been a
method to gauge claims that a judge's behavior or conduct has biased the trial
against the defendant. It is also likely true because of appellate courts' general
reluctance to review motions to disqualify based on trial judges' behavior as
proof of bias. Yet, as Professor Leubsdorf has argued, without the benefit of
empirical support, judges' behavior provides "the strongest possible proofs [of
judicial bias] and the proof least subject to evidentiary dispute." '266
The model allows reviewing courts to assess alleged judicial bias by
enabling them to consider as evidence patterns of behavior, rulings, and
decisions.267 Likewise, it enables counsel to develop and document the legal
and extralegal grounds for a motion alleging judicial bias. The Stanford Study
illustrates the usefulness to counsel of employing videotape analyses and the
Iowa Study shows the usefulness of employing on-line coding.
In sum, the model allows appellate courts to better calibrate the permissible
limits of trial judges' behavior in disqualification cases. Future study of this
issue may further public confidence in a core value of our system of justice
that requires judges to be fair and independent adjudicators. 68 The model
thus enables review of the values and standards underlying the legal bases for
assessing error associated with judicial bias.269 Subsequent tests may also
assess actual and perceived bias, so as to aid further in the development of
disqualification law.7 These analyses are warranted, given the findings
from the Iowa Study that the appearance ofjustice alone impacts independent-
ly on trial outcomes and sentencing patterns.
265. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 142-46 (reviewing issues related to appellate
court review of judges' behavior).
266. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 275.
267. See id. at 275 (suggesting that appellate courts consider a pattern of decisions evidencing bias
when ruling on disqualification motions); cf appendix A (mocking trial proceeding in William Kennedy
Smith trial).
268. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 219, at 830 (reviewing the non-instrumental value of the
appearance of justice); Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 278 (pointing out that the appearance standard
promotes public confidence in the judiciary); Redish & Marshall, supra note 60, at 485-86 (summarizing
the various non-instrumental values); cf. infra notes 270-90 and accompanying text (discussing results
for sentencing).
269. Cf Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 278 (suggesting that the appearance-of-justice standard alone
shifts attention away from objective judicial bias to what appears to be judicial bias to a reasonable
observer).
270. Id. at 279 (arguing that reliance on the appearance-of-justice standard alone will result in a
tendency to disqualify judges in rare cases, such as the case of a judge's verbal or nonverbal expression
of bias or public facts that support an inference of bias).
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C. Research on Sentencing
Prior empirical research has focused primarily on disparity and discrimina-
tion in judges' sentencing patterns.271 Studies conducted before the enact-
ment of the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines show that broad judicial
discretion in sentencing often resulted in disparate sentencing patterns.272
More recent studies demonstrate that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
significantly reduced the range of sentences imposed upon different offenders
for a similar crimes.273
Sentencing guidelines allow judges to consider several factors in reaching
their decisions. For instance, when the Federal Sentencing Commission
established offender categories, they considered, among other things, the
individual defendant's age, employment record, and criminal history
variables.2 74 But sentencing guidelines are meant to be blind to other
factors, such as the defendant's gender, race, and socioeconomic status, 2
75
in order to provide uniformity and fairness in the sentencing process. 276
The Iowa findings have implications for the study of uniformity and fairness
in sentencing. The findings illustrate the impact of legal and extralegal forces
on sentencing.277 This study, as well as other similar studies, shows that
combinations of variables in the model did not accurately predict the
magnitude of the sentences. 278 The Iowa results also comport with findings
that sentence disparity in misdemeanor criminal cases is relatively IOW. 279
271. For a review, see Karle & Sager, supra note 50.
272. Id. at 395 (summarizing prior empirical research on sentencing and noting that judge
background variables were better predictors of the magnitude of the sentence than defendant and crime
variables); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1990) (same).
273. Karle & Sager, supra note 50, at 407.
274. Nagel, supra note 272, at 904. These factors are considered only to the extent that they are
relevant. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 932 (stating that the Guidelines' purpose is to promote uniformity, fairness, certainty, and
proportionality).
277. Cf James L. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Representational
Model of Judicial Decision Makingi 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 343, 345 (1980) (focusing on process of
decision making and sentencing in the Iowa courts).
278. See supra notes 121-73 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Imogen Brown & Roy Hullin, A Study
of Sentencing in the Leeds Magistrates Courts: The Treatment of Ethnic Minority and White Offenders,
32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 41, 52 (1992) (reviewing empirical study in United Kingdom where courts
did not find discrimination based on race in sentencing and citing other studies in support of this
finding).
279. William Austin & Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal
Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 309 (1977).
Sentencing disparity is related to the type of offense, occurring least in drunken-driving cases and most
in drug-cases. Id.
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These findings contrast with the historical view that "the sentencing tendency
of the judge seems to be fairly well determined before he sits on the
bench."28 0
Future tests of the model will focus on the impact of other background
variables on the magnitude of the sentence imposed, controlling for type of
case and strength of the evidence. In one study conducted in 1981 by Clancy
and his colleagues, greater variance in sentencing disparity was primarily
explained by background differences among individual judges rather than by
other factors such as offense type or offender characteristics.28" ' Clancy also
found that judges show relative leniency for younger defendants and are
somewhat more harsh for middle-age offenders.282 In contrast, the Iowa
Study did not find an independent relationship between defendant age and
magnitude of the sentence imposed.2 83 Nor did combinations of the model
variables significantly predict the magnitude of the sentence.284 Research in
more complex federal and state trials is needed to examine the value of the
Iowa on-line coding method to the systematic study of fairness and uniformity
in the sentencing process.285
Study of the model may also identify particular types of cases in which
sentencing disparities are most apparent. For instance, there is a general lack
of empirical information, particularly concerning state court sentencing
patterns.286 A 1980 study that examined sentencing patterns in state courts
analyzed the relationship between mode of case disposition (i.e., bench or jury
280. Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 814 (1933).
281. See Kevin Clancy et al., Sentencing Decision Making: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the
Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 535, 551-53 (1981)
(finding that extralegal factors--such as judges' orientations or views of the criminal justice
system-account for 40% of the variance in prison time sentences). The Stanford Study explored the
relation among judge background variables, such as age, gender, expectations, and communicative
behavior. The findings show that a judge's age and gender relates to his or her communication style
with jurors, and this relationship is mediated by other factors in the model. See The Appearance of
Justice, supra note 1, At 124-28.
282. Clancy et al., supra note 281, at 539. Defendants over age 60 are given relative leniency. Id.
283. The Iowa Study did find such a relationship with trial outcome. See supra notes 136-37 and
accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 182 & 185 and accompanying text.
285. Cf Clancy et al., supra note 281, at 525 (noting that there is little empirical evidence on
sentencing disparity in the federal courts, "and virtually no empirical investigation of the phenomenon
on a national scale").
286. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part , 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1059, 1085 & n.89 (1976) (noting-before sentencing guidelines were in effect-the limited data on
state court sentencing patterns); cf. FEELEY, supra note 7, at xvi ("[R]ecurring and continuous
phenomenon in lower courts may not occur in higher courts... [and] there are no published fill length
comparative studies of lower criminal courts.").
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trial) and sentencing for felony crimes, controlling for case seriousness."'
The results showed counter-intuitively that harsher sentences were imposed
on jury trial defendants than on bench trial defendants. This finding warrants
subsequent replication through analyses of other measures. Additionally,
analyses will need to delineate the sentencing variable into jail sentences and
other nonjail sanctions, such as fines or probation. 2 ' These analyses will
add to the predictive power of the model by accounting for a broader range
of sanctions. 89
Finally, the model allows for analyses over time of the factors determining
trial outcomes and sentences. For instance, the model allows researchers to
calibrate sentencing patterns longitudinally when controlling for factors such
as the strength of the evidence or defendant background characteristics.290
Additional study with different types of cases is warranted, and future tests
of the model will need to delineate the type of case (e.g., felony versus
misdemeanor crime) by a measure of charge seriousness.2 9'
CONCLUSION
Harry Kalven, Jr. wrote: "The fundamental premise in the idea of impartial
judges and rules of law is that certain kinds of decision-making, for example,
by judges, can by institutional arrangements and role discipline be made to
show less variance and less correlation to personal factors than other kinds of
decision-making ...."292 This premise has been tested in the present
studies. Some of the findings are encouraging, others require additional
study.293
287. Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, "He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His".
An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 323 (1980)
(reviewing histories of some 30,000 state cases); cf. supra note 196 (Iowa results of seriousness of crime
as measured by maximum sentence variable).
288. Uhlman & Walker, supra note 287, at 327 (suggesting similar analysis).
289. Scales of sentence type and severity have been developed and would enhance the predictive
power of the model. Id. at 327-28.
290. Cf. Austin & Williams, supra note 279, at 309 (discussing a simulated study that assessed
sentencing disparity among the same type of judges in the same state jurisdiction and showed that the
strength of evidence affects disparity in verdicts and sentences; for instance, where evidence was weak,
sentence disparity was higher).
291. See supra note 196 (discussing results for maximum sentence variable as proxy for case
seriousness); see also Uhlman & Walker, supra note 287, at 329 (using measure of case seriousness and
charge severity). Moreover, analyses may be performed at critical points during the trial. See, e.g.,
Schulhofer, supra note 213, at 1071 (noting that in bench trials closing arguments were a time of active
participation by judges).
292. Harry Kalven, Jr., Toward a Science of Impartial Judicial Behavior, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 591,
594 (1973).
293. The program of research follows Kalven's views on the relation of law and social science: "Let
us empiricize jurisprudence and intellectualize fact finding." Id. at 595.
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The research in this Article has explored the legal and extralegal factors
related to decision making in bench trials. The findings support the view that
many forces, independently and in combination, contribute to decision making
and sentencing. The long-term goal is to understand the meaning of terms
central to conceptions of justice, such as "trial fairness," "trial error," and
"judicial bias." A more immediate goal is to demonstrate how, in some cases,
trial outcomes reflect trial participants' beliefs, attitudes, and biases more than
we would like to acknowledge.
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APPENDIX A
One View of Nonverbal Behavior in the Courtroom
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APPENDIX B
Summary of Data Collection Instruments for
Iowa Study of Bench Trials
The following instructions and data collection instruments were provided to
all observers. Each observer also received in-depth training on how to use the









2. Instructions for Coding This Trial
The following set of instructions are meant to guide you through the process
of studying this trial. The information on the cover sheet and on the
background variables of trial participants can be obtained through the analysis
of the complaint form for the trial, which is located in the Clerk of Misde-
meanor's Office. Ask for this form only from this office, never while it is in
possession of the presiding magistrate (judge). It is also possible to determine
this information from observation of the trial.
The main task of this study is to observe and rate the behaviors of the judge
during various parts of the trial. All ratings should be done with the same
timing method, with exact coordination of timing between the two raters of
the trial. The starting and stopping time for each rating should be the same for
each rater; that is, the ratings should be done simultaneously. However, your
ratings of the judge's behavior is to be done separate and independently. No
consultation between raters should occur on the description of the judge's
behavior or any other descriptions about the trial. The ratings you make
should be based solely on your own beliefs and perceptions about this trial,
as are all other observations.
118319931
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3. Codebook Table of Contents
Actual Page Number
Stage of Trial in Codebook
I. Background Variables of the Trial Participants
A. Defendant ....................................... 1
1. List of Charges in this Trial ......................... 1
B. Judge ........................................... 2
C. Prosecuting Attorney ................................ 2
D. Defense Attorney .................................. 2
II. Defense's Opening Statement
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge .......................... 3
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 4
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ......... 5
III. Prosecution's Opening Statement
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge .......................... 6
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 7
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ......... 8
IV. Direct Examination of the First Witness
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge .......................... 9
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ........................ 10
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ........ 11
D. Record of Objections Made by Counsel .................. 12
V. Cross-Examination of the First Witness
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 13
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ........................ 14
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ........ 15
D. Record of Objections Made by Counsel .................. 16
[Index Portion Indicating Same Format for All Witnesses Deleted]
XII. Prosecution's Closing Statement
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 41
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ........................ 42
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ........ 43
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XIII. Defense's Closing Statement
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 44
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ........................ 45
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ........ 46
XIV. Final Deliberation by the Judge
A. Micro Behaviors of the Judge ......................... 47
B. Global Behaviors of the Judge ........................ 48
C. Your Rating of Judge's Expectations of Trial Outcome ........ 49
XV. Verdict for Each Charge Reached by the Jury .............. 50
XVI. Sentence Imposed by the Judge for Each Charge ........... 51
XVII. Final Ratings of the Trial
A. Rating of Competency for All Trial Participants ............ 52
B. Rating of the Complexity of the Evidence in this Trial ........ 53
C. Rating of the Strength of the Evidence in this Trial .......... 54
D. Description of the Strength of the Evidence ............... 54
E. How Did the Prosecuting Attorney Influence the Trial Outcome? . 55
F. How Did the Defense Attorney Influence the Trial Outcome? ... 56
G. How Did the Judge Influence the Trial Outcome? . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4. Samples of Codebook Instructions
I. Background Variables of Trial Participants
A. Defendant
1. Sex: Male/Female
2. Age: 18-25, 26-35, 35-45, 46-older
3. Race:
4. Socioeconomic Status: High/Medium/Low
List the charges and/or counts in this trial. (List the criminal code
sections and the names of charges for each count. This information can






2. Age: 18-25, 26-35, 35-45, 46-older
3. Race:
4. Date appointed to bench:
C. Prosecuting Attorney
1. Sex: Male/Female
2. Age: 18-25, 26-35, 35-45, 46-older
3. Race:
4. Number of years in practice:
D. Defense Attorney or Pro Se
1. Sex: Male/Female
2. Age: 18-25, 26-35, 35-45, 46-older
3. Race:
4. Number of years in practice:
II. Defense's Opening Statement [Same Format for Defense's Closing
Argument and for Prosecutor's Opening Statement and Closing Argument]
A. Micro Behaviors of Judge
Please tally the following micro nonverbal behaviors of the judge for the
first five minutes of the defense's opening statement.
Time Start Time Stop
1. Amount of eye contact with trial participants (at least 2-3 seconds)
Tallies Total
2. Number of smiles
Tallies Total
3. Number of significant head nods
Tallies Total
4. Number of forward leans
Tallies Total
5. Number of significant hand movements
Tallies Total
6. Number of significant changes in posture
Tallies Total
7. Number of self-touching behaviors
Tallies Total
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B. Global Behaviors of Judge
Please now rate the following "global" behaviors of the judge for the
firstfive minutes of the defense's opening statement.
not at all judicial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very judicial
(Behavioral examples: professional, dignified, wise, and fair)
not at all directive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very directive
(Behavioral examples: task-oriented, administrative, emphasis on
procedure)
not at all warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very warm
(Behavioral examples: empathic, supporting, accepting)
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very confident
(Behavioral examples: self-assured, interested, emotionally comfortable
with other trial participants)
C. Prediction of Judge's Expectations
Based on your reactions to the defense's complete opening statement,
what do you believe the judge expects the outcome of the trial to be?
Time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Defendant Defendant Not Defendant Defendant
Definitely Probably Sure Probably Definitely
Guilty Guilty Not Guilty Not Guilty
Please give comments and reasons for your rating.
IV. Direct Examination of the First Witness [Same Format for All Witnesses]
A. Micro Behaviors of Judge
Please tally the following micro nonverbal behaviors of the judge for the
first five minutes of the direct examination of the first witness.
Time start Time stop
Witness is testifying for: Defense/Prosecution (circle one)
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1. Amount of eye contact with trial participants (at least 2-3 seconds)
Tallies Total
2. Number of smiles
Tallies Total
3. Number of significant head nods
Tallies Total
4. Number of forward leans
Tallies Total
5. Number of significant hand movements
Tallies Total
6. Number of significant changes in posture
Tallies Total
7. Number of self-touching behaviors
Tallies Total
B. Global Behaviors of Judge
Please now rate the following "global" behaviors of the judge for the
firstfive minutes of direct examination of thefirst witness.
not at all judicial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very judicial
(Behavioral examples: professional, dignified, wise, and fair)
not at all directive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very directive
(Behavioral examples: task-oriented, administrative, emphasis on
procedure)
not at all warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very warm
(Behavioral examples: empathic, supporting, accepting)
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very confident
(Behavioral examples: self-assured, interested, emotionally comfortable
with other trial participants)
C. Predictions of Judge's Expectations
Based on your reactions to the direct examination of the first witness,
what do you believe the judge expects the outcome of the trial to be?
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Time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Defendant Defendant Not Defendant Defendant
Definitely Probably Sure Probably Definitely
Guilty Guilty Not Guilty Not Guilty
Please give comments and reasons for your rating.
D. Objections
Record the objections made by counsel during the testimony of this
witness in the following format.
Objection #_.
Objection made by: Defense/Prosecution (Circle One)
Description of the objection itself (write it as close as possible to
its original wording)
Judge's ruling on this objection: sustained/overruled
XV. Verdict for Each Charge Reached by the Jury
Please record the verdict for each charge or count reached by the Judge at
the end of the trial proceedings.
[Coded the Same for Each Count]
1. Charge Guilty Not Guilty
a. Count 1 Guilty Not Guilty
b. Count 2 Guilty Not Guilty
XVI. Sentence Imposed by the Judge for Each Charge
For each charge or count of which the defendant has been found guilty,
state the sentence or penalty imposed by the judge. Also state the maximum
possible sentence for each charge. Regular misdemeanor sentence is thirty
(30) days in county jail and/or a $100 fine. There is an exception for a
scheduled fine. If the words "scheduled fine" appear on the face of the
complaint form, the maximum sentence is always the sentence imposed by
the judge.







XVII. Final Ratings of the Trial
A. Rating of Competency for all Trial Participants
Please rate on the following scales the competency of each significant
participant in this trial.
1. Competence of the Judge
not at allcompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. Competence of the Prosecuting Attorney
not at all competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. Competence of the Defense Attorney
not at all competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. Competence of the Defense's Witnesses
not at allcompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. Competence of the Prosecution's Witnesses
not at all competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9






Please rate on the following scale how complex you perceive the
evidence in this trial to be. Consider the factual complexity of evidence
and the complexity of legal technicalities. Other factors to consider are
sophisticated analysis of physical evidence, specialized knowledge, or
opinions of significant professionals (e.g., psychologists or medical
doctors) on complicated subject matter or legal matters.
not at allcomplex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very complex
1. Please provide comments on the evidence that was not complex and
on evidence that was very complex.
(An example of evidence that is not complex would be direct
eyewitness testimony to the crime. Evidence that is complex would
be scientific analysis of the crime scene, medical examination of
defendant or victim, or complicated legal matters.)
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C. Rating of the Strength of the Evidence
Please rate on the following scale the cumulative strength or effect of all
the evidence that would lead to a verdict.
strong guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 weak guilt
D. Description of the Strength of the Evidence
If the evidence was weak toward guilt, please give a description and
comments of what was weak about it. If the evidence was strong please
give a description and comments of what was strong about it. Please
comment on what weak or strong evidence influenced a verdict of not
guilty or guilty.
E. Did the Prosecuting Attorney Influence the Trial Outcome? [Coded the
same for defense attorney and judge]
not at all influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very influential
Please state in a descriptive fashion if the prosecuting attorney influenced
the outcome of this trial in either direction, and how he or she did so.
(Examples may be: built strong or weak arguments; method of speech was
boring or entertaining, interrupted, or fluent; was extremely enthusiastic or





This Appendix highlights the reliability, consistency, and validity of the on-
line rating method.
1. Observer Reliability
There is little systematic information available to researchers, courts, and
practitioners about the simple reliability and utility (effective reliability) of
ratings of on-line courtroom behaviors and processes. An unanswered
empirical question is how much of trial behavior needs to be studied or
sampled to generalize that behavior to other parts of the trial or to other trials.
A related question is the extent to which behavior at critical points in the trial
process (e.g., during the testimony of defendant) impacts on assessments of
other segments of that trial.294 The analyses in this Section begin to develop
these issues.
The simple reliability of a single observer is identical to the reliability (i.e.,
the correlation) between any two observers on a particular variable. The
effective or actual reliability is the reliability of the mean of the two
observers' observations on a particular variable.295 Effective reliability better
estimates the agreement among the sample of observers for the measures
tested in the model. Simple and effective reliabilities are presented next for
several of the variables under study.296
a. Reliability for Background Variables
Predictably, the observers show high agreement in coding the defendants'
background variables:
294. See The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 118 n.97 (calling for future research on the
psychometric study of trial processes and behavior).
295. For a review of these concepts, see Robert Rosenthal, Conducting Judgment Studies, in
HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR RESEARCH 287, 292-95 (Klaus R. Scherer & Paul
Ekman eds., 1982). The use of effective reliability depends on the assumption that a comparable group
of observers would show comparable mean reliability among themselves and with the actual group of
ten observers here. Id. at 293.
296. Simple reliability is referred to as "r" and effective reliability as "er."
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age: r and er = .99;
gender: r and er = 1.0;
socioeconomic status: r = .90, er = .95; and
criminal history: r = .70, er = .82.297
These findings suggest that researchers interested in assessing the objective
background variables of trial participants may obtain highly reliable results
employing relatively few observers.
b. Reliability for Expectancy Variables
Observers show fairly high agreement in assessing judges' expectations for
trial outcomes over the course of entire trials. The reliabilities of the "B"
variable during the trial segments are:
witness testimony: r = .51, er = .68;
closing arguments: 298 r = .54, er =70; and
judges' deliberation periods: 299 r = .14, er = .26.
The average reliability for the "B" variable is r = .40, er = .57.300 Over the
course of entire trials, therefore, researchers should beable to develop reliable
estimates of judges' expectations for trial outcomes as perceived by groups
of independent obs.rvers.
c. Reliability for Communicative Variables
This part presents the simple and effective reliabilities for the communica-
tive variables over the course of entire trials. The purpose is to explore the
extent to which on-line observers can reliably assess judges' communicative
behavior. The reliabilities of the seven micro behaviors are:
eye contact: r = .44, er = .61;
head nods: r = .60, er = .75;
hand movements: r = .58, er = 73;
postural changes: r = .20, er = .33;
self-touching: r = .58, er = .73;
smiles: r = .05, er = .10; and
forward leans: r = .21, er = .35.
Judges' smiling behavior is the least reliable micro measure, while eye
contact, head nods, hand movements, and self-touching show relatively high
reliability. The average reliability for the "C" micro variables is r = .39,
297. All findings for "A" reliabilities are statistically significant at p < .0001.
298. Sample size for this finding is 11 trials.
299. Sample size for this finding is 18 trials.
300. This average is statistically significant atp < .001.
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er = .56.31' These findings add to the literature in other contexts that micro
nonverbal variables can be assessed reliably over the course of entire
trials.30 2
The reliabilities of the four global behaviors are:
judicial: r = .44, er = .61;
directive: r = .04, er = .08;
warm: r = .60, er = .75; and
confident: r = .32, er = .48.
The judicial, warm, and confident styles show fairly high observer
reliability, while the directive style is rated much less reliably. The average
reliability for the "C" global variables is r = .35, er = .52.303 The findings
for the micro behaviors and global styles suggest that, over the course of
entire trials, observers may assess judges' communicative behavior reliably.
The findings do not suggest, however, that brief segments ofjudges' behavior
may be naively substituted for assessments made on entire trials. The findings
may aid researchers, practitioners, or courts in more effectively developing
on-line coding techniques to calibrate the permissible limits of judges'
behavior.3 4
d. Reliability for Evidentiary Variables
The reliabilities for ratings of the strength and complexity of the evidence
are as follows:
strength of the evidence: 3 5 r = .64, er = .78; and
complexity of the evidence: 30 6 r = .25, er = .40.
Thus, over the course of these trials, observers are able to agree reliably as
to the strength and complexity of the evidence. Because of the central
importance of this variable, future researchers might be advised to employ
more observers than used here or more detailed analyses of the quality of the
evidence (or of evidentiary error) to achieve a higher level of reliability on
this variable. The analyses herein focus on the strength of the evidence, which
is rated more reliably in this study than the complexity of the evidence.
The finding of relatively high reliability for the strength of the evidence
variable is encouraging, given that the ratings are made of actual evidence
presented during "live" trials. Prior studies involving simulated and summary
301. This average is statistically significant atp < .001.
302. See supra note 295.
303. This average is statistically significant at p < .00 1.
304. See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text (discussing structural and harmless errors).
305. Sample size for this test is 48 trials. Results are statistically significant at p < .0001.
306. Sample size for this test is 50 trials. Results are statistically significant atp < .0001.
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evidentiary ratings have suggested that often there is not close agreement
regarding ratings of the prejudice associated with various items of evi-
dence.30 7 In one study, members of the bench and community were asked
to evaluate the prejudice associated with various evidentiary items in the
context of a summarized trial. 308 The findings show that lawyer and lay
participants did not share a common evaluation (e.g., finding low observer
reliability) regarding the prejudice associated with various evidentiary items.
The present findings suggest that these on-line observers of courtroom
processes agree reliably as to the strength of the evidence. They may also
suggest that, to the extent that the independent observers in this study are
more like "jurors" than they are counsel or judges, these observers are able
to develop a common evaluation (though not necessarily a correct one) of
evidentiary strength.3" 9
e. Reliability for Verdict Variable
Predictably, the observers agree perfectly as to the coding of trial outcomes
(r and er = 1.0, for all 52 trials).
f. Reliability for Sentence Variable
Again, predictably, the observers agree strongly as to the magnitude of the
sentence imposed by the judge (r and er = .99, for 40 trials).
g. Reliability for Competence/Influence Variables
At the conclusion of the trials, the competence and influence of the judge
and prosecution and defense attorneys were rated. The simple and effective
reliability of these ratings are:
310
307. See, e.g., Teitelbaum et al., supra note 215, at 1172-76 (finding high disagreement within and
across groups of professional and lay observers of evidence).
308. Id. at 1156 (noting that the purpose of the study, in part, was to identify items that were high
and low in prejudice).
309. But see id. at 1163 (implying that jurors may not share common evaluation of evidence in
simulated trial study). Of the ten observers in the Iowa Study, eight were law students and two were
undergraduate pre-law students.
310. Blank slots in the table indicate that sufficient data were not available.
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Competence Influence
r er r er
Judge31 1 .20 .33 .18 .31
Prosecution Counsel31 2  .06 .11 .37 .54
Defense Counsel313  .84 .91 .70 .82
Prosecution Witness 314  .37 .54
Defense Witness"' .44 .61
The central conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that there
is a good deal of variability in the ratings of the ability of trial participants.
For instance, there is only moderate agreement as to judge competence and
influence. Subsequent researchers may consider employing more observers in
the collection of additional information regarding the subjective and actual
competencies of trial participants.1 6
2. Consistency of the Ratings During the Trial
The analyses in this section explore the consistency of the ratings of the
"B" and "C" variables over the segments of the trial-for example, across
witness testimony, closing arguments, and deliberation period." 7 To assess
the consistency of these variables, intraclass correlations averaged over the
ratings of the observers are*computed. As in Section 1 of this Appendix, the
effective reliability of the mean of the three segments of the trials is also
presented.
a. Consistency for Expectancy Variables
The simple reliability of any single segment for the "B" variable is .83. The
effective reliability of the mean of the segments of the trials assessed is .94.
These findings suggest that the ratings of judges' expectations are assessed
consistently across the segments of these trials.
311. Sample size is 49 trials.
312. Sample size is 49 trials.
313. Sample size is 8 trials, therefore these results are presented for exploratory purposes and must
be viewed with caution. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
314. Sample size is 42 trials. Data for influence measure is not available.
315. Sample size is 30 trials. Data for influence measure is not available.
316. For systematic technique for assessing individual and group behaviors, see ROBERT F. BALES
& STEPHEN P. COHEN, SYMLOG: A SYSTEM FOR THE MULTIPLE LEVEL OBSERVATION OF GROUPS
(1979).
317. For a review of similar analyses, see The Appearance of Justice, supra note 1, at 118 n.97. The
methodological question of interest to researchers, practitioners, and courts is whether "B" and "C"
variables can be assessed consistently (over time) from the five minute segments of these trials.
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b. Consistency for Communicative Variables
The simple and effective reliabilities illustrate the degree to which judges'
behavior may be assessed consistently across the three trial segments (e.g.,
witnesses, closing statement, and deliberation). The reliabilities of the seven
micro behaviors are:
eye contact: r = -.24, er = na;
31'
head nods: r = .48, er = .73;
hand movements: r = .59, er = 81;
postural changes: r = .27, er = .53;
self-touching: r = .22, er = .46;
smiles: r = .00, er = .00;3' 9 and
forward leans: r = .23, er = .47.
Hand movements and head nods show relatively high consistency, yet
smiling behavior and eye contact is not assessed consistently. The average
reliability for the micro behaviors is r = .22, er = .46.320 These findings add
to the literature in other contexts showing that many micro nonverbal
variables can be assessed consistently over various trial segments.
The reliabilities of the four global styles are:
judicial: r = .91, er = .97;
directive: r = .84, er = .94;
warm: r = .94, er = .98; and
confident: r = .94, er = .98.
All four global styles are highly consistent across the trial segments.3 ' The
average reliability for the global variables is r = .91, er = .97.322 These
findings again suggest that judges' global styles can be assessed consistently
over the trial segments. 23
318. The er is not applicable ("na") to a negative r.
319. The finding of zero reliability for smiles is unpredicted and requires further fine-grain analysis.
Subsequent analyses of this micro variable must be viewed with caution because the observers vary
significantly in their assessment of smiling behavior.
320. This average is statistically significant atp < .01.
321. The overall correlation coeffi6ient between '"judicial" and "confident" is .89. Collinearity or
multicollinearity occurs when an independent variable (regressor) is a linear combination of other
independent variables (e.g., two global variables). In such a case, the regression coefficients (e.g., Tables
1-4 supra) can be unstable. See D.A. BELSLEY ET AL., REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (1980).
To assess the collinearity of the independent measures in the model, SAS Regression Collinearity
Diagnostics were employed. These analyses explore high correlations between independent measures.
The results show that only the pairing of judicial and confident global variables have a relatively high
coefficient for the same principal component. For theoretical purposes, and consistent with the Stanford
Study, it was decided in the Iowa Study to retain the four global behaviors as independent variables in
the model.
322. This average is statistically significant at p < .001.




The purpose of this Appendix was to further the analysis of the reliability
and consistency of the variables in the model of courtroom behavior.
Consistent with earlier suggestions, 3 4 brief segments of trials may not be
naively substituted as effective predictors of other portions of the trial
process. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that most "B" and "C" variables,
in particular judges' global behavior, may be assessed reliably and consistent-
ly by on-line ratings of trials. It is encouraging also that the consistency of
the judges' behavioral styles could be assessed reliably from only the first
five minutes of the various trial segments.
Further study is warranted to understand the implications of the degree of
reliability and consistency in judges' styles in relating to juries and other trial
participants. The model allows for an assessment of the relation between
consistency in judges' behavior and perceived or actual bias or trial error by
the judge. It may allow also for an examination of the relation among judges'
or lawyers' consistency (e.g., effectiveness), trial outcomes, and sentencing
patterns.
324. The Measure of the Judge, supra note 1, at 666 n.63 (noting that more research is needed before
any conclusive statement may be made about the generalizability of videotape analyses to other parts
of trials).
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